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ABSTRACT 
United States Navy officers and enlisted personnel have always recognized the 
unique power and capability of the senior enlisted community that binds these groups 
together and is integral to the success of Navy operations. Yet, little has been 
systematically written about the leadership characteristics of this group that make them so 
vital to the Navy. This study examines senior enlisted leadership in the U.S. Navy, 
focusing on the unique community of master chief petty officers. Data were attained 
through in-depth interviews of 19 master chief participants who were identified as 
particularly successful. Results identify characteristics of the chief petty officer (CPO) 
that are common to all good leaders, but also characteristics that are unique to this group. 
For example, the camaraderie of the Chief’s Mess provides the CPO Mess immense 
power, Navy-wide. A philosophy of “command first, person second” is widely endorsed, 
which creates the ultimate team experience, led by the Command Master Chief.  The 
master chief’s unique and innovative characteristics will be critical in sustaining Naval 
operations in the course of leading the Millennials into the 21st century. Further research 
on senior enlisted leadership is suggested. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
"If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, 
you are a leader.” - John Quincy Adams 
A. OVERVIEW 
Highly effective leadership is essential in the Navy’s ability to adapt through 230 
years of change, threats, and the ability to sustain the world’s greatest Navy.  The United 
States Navy has been blessed with top-notch enlisted leadership.  This leadership, in 
particular the rank of chief petty officer to master chief petty officer, has been the “glue” 
to the world’s most dominating Navy for nearly 117 years. 
One of the greatest challenges for the Navy since its inception has been to remain 
a principal force during numerous conflicts and threats.  By and far, America has 
responded without question to any and all threats that have jeopardized the freedom and 
principles upon which this nation was built.  The Navy has been led through these times 
by men and women who have embraced the challenge of leadership with a “can do” 
attitude, resulting in sustained freedom and superior performance. 
Leadership from the deck-plates up has been as essential for the Navy as middle 
management for Ford Motor Company.  The blue collar chief has led and will continue to 
lead through his or her actions, by mentoring young enlisted men and women, while 
training junior Naval officers, and by correcting the senior officer, when no else wants to 
put his or her neck on the line.  This is the foundation on which the Navy’s leadership 
was built. 
As the military changes in response to the changing environment, leadership must 
remain flexible and willing to lead different personalities and often times different 
generational mentalities through extremely adverse conditions.  The Navy has groomed 
the chief petty officer to fulfill this complex duty in a wide variety of ways.  As chiefs 
develop into senior chiefs, then master chiefs, they become highly skilled in leading and 
displaying leadership skills that are quite unique and valuable.  The master chief, in many 
instances, becomes a consummate professional at leading up, down, and laterally. 
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The most common thread to any naval operation are the chief petty officers.  They 
have lived it, seen it, slept it and, most importantly, learned from past successes and 
failures.  This experience is invaluable and part of the career progression of a chief petty 
officer.  These experiences are vital and aid in the development of the talent pool within 
the chief petty officer community.  To fully understand enlisted leadership one must 
understand the driving force behind the blue collar Navy, the master chief petty officer.  
This thesis will explore the leadership techniques of chief petty officers and the 
challenges posed for their leadership in the future. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine enlisted leadership with a focus on 
master chief petty officers and their leadership methods.  The goal is to understand key 
leadership characteristics used to complement behaviors that are frequently observed 
within highly effective senior enlisted leaders, and how they actually get the job done as 
the enlisted leaders of the United States Navy. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1. Methodology 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
• Conduct a thorough review of enlisted naval leadership practices. 
• Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM 
systems, and other library information resources to determine the approach 
of this study based on past literature and/or studies that have been the 
focus of senior enlisted leadership in the U.S. Navy. 
• Conduct in-depth interviews with selected master chief petty officers to 
determine their leadership characteristics and how these characteristics 
will contribute to future success with the challenges ahead.  The interview 
process will also target two administrators who are familiar with the chief 
petty officer selection process (these administrators may come from the 
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participants).  The target population sample will be roughly 25 (if 
definitive patterns develop after 10–15 interviews, the interview process 
may be halted).  The selected group will be handpicked by an experienced 
master chief who has the experience and position to identify high 
performing master chiefs. 
• The interview process will attempt to extract key variables such as 
observed characteristics that complement behaviors, which are unique to 
this group of leaders and that have been inherently vital to the relationship 
between enlisted leadership and the officer community. 
2. Scope 
The scope of this study will include: 
• Two assumptions: Command Master Chief Jacqueline DiRosa has over 28 
years of naval service, including over 10 years as a command master chief, 
and has the distinct designation of being the first enlisted woman selected 
for both force and fleet master chief, among other accomplishments.  This 
study is fortunate to have Command Master Chief DiRosa as the primary 
source for identifying “highly effective” senior enlisted leaders.  The 
second assumption is that master chief petty officers are highly effective 
senior enlisted leaders.  Making this assumption is relatively safe; being 
that one percent of the U.S. Navy’s enlisted end strength attains the rank 
of master chief petty officer. 
• The limitations of this study will come from interview participants.  The 
interviews will focus solely on master chiefs (E-9 pay grade).  These 
limitations are necessary to focus the study on high quality master chiefs 
with superior leadership characteristics.  This will establish a benchmark 
for best practices.  By utilizing an “expert” to select the sample size this 
will generate more accurate results.  This does introduce bias; however, 
this seems to be the most logical manner to obtain a representative sample. 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide keen insight into the leadership methods of master chief 
petty officers.  More specifically, the study will establish key leadership characteristics 
that are frequently observed within highly effective senior enlisted leaders.  This research 
will solidify why master chiefs are the “glue” to the core of naval leadership.  It will 
serve as a study for future chiefs and officers to reference, providing leadership tools and 
insight from the elite of the elite.  Additionally, the research will provide insight into 
future challenges for this cadre of Navy leaders. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains seven chapters; the remaining six chapters are briefly 
described in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Organization of Study 
Chapter Brief Summary 
II Addresses the methodology utilized to conduct the study, which will include the 
structure and focus of interviews, along with limitations of the study. 
III Presents the chief petty officer history and background related to the early 
beginnings, development of the rank structure, information on the Navy’s ratings, 
and concludes with the mission, vision, and guiding principles of today’s chief petty 
officer. 
IV Presents a review of previous studies related to senior enlisted leadership, leadership 
in general, and leadership in regards to civil counterparts. 
V Delves into the process of how one becomes a chief petty officer.  This chapter 
reviews the career path of a CPO, including selection process, evaluations, and the 
training and education that most indoctrinated CPOs attain once they don the 
coveted gold foul anchors. 
VI Describes the results of an in-depth interview process that identifies the leadership 
characteristics of a highly effective senior enlisted leader. 
VII Provides a summary of this study, offers conclusions, and provides 
recommendations. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
“The price of greatness is responsibility.” 
– Winston Churchill 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section of the study provides a thorough understanding of the methodology 
that was utilized to collect and analyze data on senior enlisted leadership.  The data were 
generated through in-depth interviews with selected master chief petty officers to 
determine their leadership characteristics and how these characteristics will contribute to 
the future success of senior enlisted leadership with the challenges ahead.  Interviews 
were conducted with one individual at a time, and lasted approximately one hour per 
interviewee.  All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity in their responses and were 
told that they would receive a summary of the thesis results.  The interview process also 
targeted two administrators who are familiar with the chief petty officer selection 
process, and five retired chief petty officers, to gain their perspective on civilian versus 
military chain of command and leadership.  The target population sample resulted in 17 
active duty master chiefs and two retired master chiefs.  Table 2 illustrates the selected 
group that was handpicked by a master chief who has the experience and position to 
identify high performing master chiefs.  The total number of years in the Navy amongst 
the participants, tallied over 504 years and 144 years at the rank of Master Chief Petty 
Officer (MCPO).  
Table 2.   Interview Participants 
Current 
Rate 
Rating Prior 
to CMDCM 
Years in 
Navy 
Years as 
CMC or 
Master Chief 
Active Duty 
(AD) or 
Retired 
Male or 
Female 
GSCM GS 27 10 as MC AD M 
CMDCM ET NUC 29 9 as CMC AD M 
CMDCM YN 26 2 as CMC AD M 
FTCM FT 30 9 as MC Retired M 
CMDCM AM 26 8 as MC AD M 
HMCM HM 28 8 as MC AD M 
CMDCM FC 30 10 as CMC AD M 
CMDCM SK 24 5 as CMC AD M 
CMDCM HM 28 11 as CMC AD F 
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Current 
Rate 
Rating Prior 
to CMDCM 
Years in 
Navy 
Years as 
CMC or 
Master Chief 
Active Duty 
(AD) or 
Retired 
Male or 
Female 
CTRCM CTR 28 9 as MC AD M 
CMDCM EN 30 12 as MC AD M 
NCCM NC 22 7 as MC AD F 
CTNCM CTN 18 1 as MC AD M 
CMDCM YN 24 3 as CMC AD F 
CMDCM CTI 23 6 as CMC AD M 
NDCM ND 29 6 as MC AD M 
FORCM HM 30 11 as MC AD F 
FLTCM SK 27 12 as MC AD M 
ETCM ET NUC 25 5 as MC Retired M 
Note: All years are estimated rounded to closest year 
The interview process was designed to extract key variables such as observed 
characteristics that complement effective leadership behaviors, which are unique to this 
group and that have been inherently vital to the relationship between enlisted leadership 
and the officer community.  While this methodology utilized qualitative measures, the 
author believes that these “real” life examples will provide useful insights into 
understanding how and why these particular senior enlisted leaders have been effective 
and will aid in shaping the Navy’s future leaders. 
B. INTERVIEWS 
1. Sampling Plan 
The sampling plan was rather straightforward; find “high quality” master chief 
petty officers who have shown effective leadership methods.  Finding “high quality” 
master chiefs is somewhat of a nonsensical term, as approximately one percent of the 
U.S. Navy’s enlisted end strength can call themselves a master chief.  That, in and of 
itself, is rarified company.  As of December 2009, there were 2,613 active duty master 
chief petty officers (MCPOs), along with 200 plus reserve MCPOs.  The total is 
estimated to be around 2,800 master chief petty officers in the Navy.  Of these 2,800 
MCPOs, there are approximately 750 Command Master Chief (CMC/CMDCM) billets, 
which include Force Master Chiefs (FORCM), Fleet Master Chiefs (FLTCM), and Chief 
of the Boats (COB) for both active and reserve units. 
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As previously mentioned, Master Chief Jacqueline DiRosa was instrumental in 
identifying the participants of this study.  She is currently the Command Master Chief for 
Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Suitland.  Refer to Appendix A for a 
detailed explanation on Master Chief DiRosa’s background and credentials. 
The next step was convincing the potential participants that this study was viable 
and worthwhile.  Once the initial e-mail was sent out by the author, there was great 
support and, honestly, no compelling story was required, just an abundance of support to 
assist with the study.  As participants were identified, the author devised a schedule to 
conduct the one-on-one interviews. 
All interviews were conducted via telephone, with one exception.  Each interview 
was audio recorded and backed up with handwritten notes by the author.  The interviews 
were designed to be approximately 45 minutes to one hour; many went longer as the 
participants had an enormous amount of knowledge and experience to impart for the 
greater good of the study. 
2. Structure and Focus of Interviews 
The structure and focus of the interviews was developed over several iterations.  
The author and advisors did two “simulated” interviews before launching the first official 
interview.  The purpose was to test out different questions and procedures, along with 
initiating the author into interview protocol and various tactics to make the interviews 
more effective.  After concluding the initial test interviews, the recommendations were to 
proceed with interview themes to streamline the various aspects of senior enlisted 
leadership.  The primary themes that were the focus of the study included: background 
(summary of career and billets held), courses (leadership courses), leadership (main focus 
of interview), industry analog (equivalent to CMC in civilian sector), career development, 
and future challenges (CPO and big Navy).  Dividing the interview into different themes 
allowed for each section to be addressed separately, while compiling accurate and 
credible data for the end product.  Appendix B shows the format and questions that were 
asked during each interview.  An important note, not all questions were asked to each 
participant due to time constraints. 
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3. Limitations 
The limitations of this study result from the interviewees.  The limitations the 
interviewees bring to the study are the particular backgrounds or lack thereof associated 
with each individual participant.  When the author made a request to Master Chief 
DiRosa to assist with this study, he recommended a diverse group of master chiefs with 
various ratings and experiences.  Fortunately, CMC DiRosa was able to deliver a diverse 
possible list of participants.  Actual participation was up to each individual notified of the 
study via e-mail.  There was no coercion or monetary incentive, just the opportunity to 
impart knowledge to a shipmate and allow those that participated in the study to critically 
think about senior enlisted leadership. 
The possible initial interview pool from Master Chief DiRosa was 28.  Two of the 
participants gave the author five more potential interviewees, plus the author used two 
MCPOs from another source, and one from one of the advisors of this study, bringing the 
total number of possible participants to 36.  Of the 36, 22 replied with either a “yes” or 
“if you need me, I can help” response, leaving 14 non-respondents.  The author 
concluded the study after 19 participants had been interviewed.  The author felt there 
were enough data and the participants had diverse experiences, totaling over 504 years 
and over 144 at the rank of MCPO.  Refer to Table 2 for a more detailed listing, 
previously in this chapter. 
The interviews focused solely on master chiefs (E-9 pay grade).  The intent was to 
acquire data on experienced CPOs to enrich this study, which the E-9 pay grade does.  
The master chief has been through the process and experiences of being an E-7 (Chief 
Petty Officer) and E-8 (Senior Chief Petty Officer).  Master Chiefs bring a unique 
experience of leadership, and they certainly have earned the right to be called master 
chief.  As stated earlier, they make up less than one percent of the enlisted ranks.  With 
this said, master chiefs, do not always demonstrate superior leadership skills, but it is a 
rather safe assumption that the participants in this study have been successful leaders as 
the majority of them have been either a Fleet, Force, or Command Master Chief or a 
Chief of the Boat. 
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CMDCM boards are held annually while FLTCMs/FORCMs and other "Flag-
Level" CMCs are selected based on a package review and interview.  All Flag-Level 
CMC assignments (approximately 100) are filled by Flag/General Officer selection 
usually after eligible CMC candidates submit a package for consideration to the 
requesting Commander.  Selection is ideally based on candidate leadership experience, 
career success, and "fit" to the assignment and selecting Commander.  Each of these 
positions is highly scrutinized and held in very high esteem and is attained based on 
being a peak performer and leader during one’s career.  Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1306.2E provides an explanation of the 
expectations and why strong leadership for FLTCMs, FORCMs, CMDCMs, and COBs is 
essential in the introduction of OPNAVINST 1306.2E, as stated below. 
Fleet Master Chiefs (FLTCMs), Force Master Chiefs (FORCMs), 
Command Master Chiefs (CMDCMs), Command Senior Chiefs (CSCs) 
and Chiefs of the Boat (COB) provide leadership to the enlisted force and 
advise Commanders/Commanding Officers on enlisted matters that 
support mission accomplishment.  They uphold and enforce the highest 
standards of professionalism, integrity and enhance active communication 
at all levels of command throughout the Department of the Navy. 
FLTCMs, FORCMs, CMDCMs, CSC and COBs report directly to their 
respective Commanders/Commanding Officers.  They advise their 
respective Commander/Commanding Officer and assist in the formulation, 
implementation and execution of policies concerning morale, welfare, job 
satisfaction, discipline, utilization and training of enlisted Sailors. 
(OPNAVINST 1306.2E section A, para. 1 and 2, 2008) 
4. Summary of Methodology and Preview of the CPO History  
This chapter pointed out the methodology along with the details to ensure a strong 
qualitative study would result from the interviews and research.  The ensuing chapter will 
give a thorough understanding of the history of the CPO, ratings, and will conclude with 
the CPO Guiding Principles and why they are essential to today’s senior enlisted 
leadership. 
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III. CHIEF PETTY OFFICER HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
“A leader is one who knows the way, shows the way, and goes the way.” 
- Author Unknown 
For the purpose of this study, and in particular Chapter III, rate and rank will be 
defined according to Table 3. 
Table 3.   Definitions of Rate and Rank 
Rank – refers to pay grade (i.e., E-1 through E-9 for purposes of this study). 
Rate – identifies the enlisted persons field of expertise and pay grade combined (i.e., Gunner’s 
Mate First Class). 
Rating – identifies the enlisted persons field of expertise, only applies to petty officers, E-4 and 
above (i.e., ET (Electronics Technician), BM (Boatswain’s Mate)). 
The official definition recorded in the The Bluejacket’s Manual is explained as follows: 
Traditionally, the term “rank” was applied only to officer pay grades, and the 
term “rate” was used to describe the enlisted pay grades.  In more recent times, 
this distinction has become less clear-cut, and enlisted pay grades are sometimes 
referred to as ranks as well.  The term “rate” really has two meanings.  Like 
“rank,” it is roughly equivalent to pay grade, and is often used that way.  For 
example, “Seaman Apprentice” or “Petty Officer Third Class” are rates.  But rate 
is also often considered a combination of pay grade and rating.  Remember that 
rating refers to an occupation and only applies to petty officers (E-4s and above).  
If someone referred to you as a “radioman,” they would be identifying you by 
your rating.  But if they called you a “radioman second class,” they would be 
referring to your rate (your occupation and your pay grade combined).  This is 
somewhat confusing, but you can stay out of trouble if you remember that rating 
always refers to occupation and rate involves pay grade. (2002, p. 48) 
 
A. EARLY BEGINNINGS 
1. The Early Years of the United States and the United States Navy 
The United States of America was discovered, as a result of colonies that fought 
and successfully won a war for independence.  These men discovered America as a result 
of navigating sea-going vessels for opportunity in the late fifteenth century.  America 
claimed her independence from Britain on July 4, 1776.  Prior to the United States 
officially becoming a nation, the Continental Congress established the Continental Navy 
(known as the United States Navy today) on October 13, 1775.  As a result, “the 
Continental Congress authorized the outfitting of a ten-gun warship “for intercepting 
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such transports as may be laden with stores for the enemy” (Cutler, 2002, p. 555).  The 
birth of the Continental Navy showed great foresight by the forefathers of America, 
launching, what today is the most powerful Navy the world has known, the United States 
Navy. 
The U.S. Navy has revolutionized over its 234 years of existence.  By no means 
has the U.S. Navy always prevailed.  This impressive organization has persevered 
through highs and lows not always meeting the challenge of the enemy, but rarely, if ever 
without resolve and tireless determination to prove its valor and unrelenting dedication to 
her country and its people to maintain freedom and democracy.  Through the face of 
adversity and tenacious leadership, the history of the United States Navy has been written 
in blood for the betterment of the future of the United States of America. 
The first major step to establishing a naval armament was the passing of the Naval 
Act of 1794.  This Act was developed in response to Thomas Jefferson urging Congress 
to re-establish an American naval force to ensure protection of American passage through 
the Mediterranean.  This was in response to 13 merchant ships being captured by Algiers 
from 1785 to 1793 (11 of which occurred in 1793).  Algiers and France were seizing 
goods and supplies from American ships, thus a plan to construct a more formal Navy 
was designed.  However, following the Revolutionary War in 1785, Congress sold the 
last remaining American ship in the Continental Navy, USS Alliance.  The United States 
was unable to support a Navy due to insufficient funds, mainly as a result of being a 
young nation with vast financial responsibilities.  From 1785 to 1797, the only armed 
maritime support available to America was the United States Revenue Cutter Service, 
which was founded in 1790 under the direction of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton.  The United States Revenue Cutter Service later merged with the United States 
Life-Saving Service to form the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in 1915. 
Protecting the United States and preserving her independence is an immense and 
expensive task not only today as a world power, but this was also true during the United 
States’ infant stages, over 200 years ago.  America’s early leaders were finding out that it 
was imperative that America have a formidable Navy if they wanted to continue to grow 
and develop as a prosperous nation.  The Naval Act of 1794 provided the following: 
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Nine brief sections which (1) authorized six ships, (2, 3, 4) set the 
numbers, grades, and ratings of officers and men, (5) gave the President 
his choice of buying or building the ships, (6, 7, 8) laid out the details of 
pay and rations, and (9) provided for the suspension of the Act upon 
negotiation of peace with Algiers.  The preamble said the Act was for the 
purpose of protecting commerce from the Barbary powers. (Smelser, p. 
11, 1958) 
This Act outlined the ships, manning, weapons, and capital needed to re-establish a Navy 
for America’s defense that would eventually become known as the United States Navy.  
2. History of the Chief Petty Officer Rank and Development of Rank 
Structure 
Chief Petty Officer has been an “official” rank for nearly 117 of the 234 years, 
essentially half of the existence of the U.S. Navy, including most of the “New Navy” and 
“Modern Navy” eras (1880–present).  In the early years of the Navy, men were paid 
based on their value; there was no classification that designated sailors as particular 
ranks.  Upon the completion of the ships that were built as a result of the Naval Act of 
1794, the manpower levels were determined for the two classes of warships.  Continental 
Congress wanted six ships that would fall under two class types, they were as follows: 
four 44 gun frigates and two 36 gun frigates.  The personnel that were targeted for duty 
on these six frigates were largely accountable for the early rates and ranks of the U.S. 
Navy.  The numbers varied between the two classes of ships, mainly due to the required 
manpower to ensure full operational status.  The manning strategy for the original six 
frigates is best summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Manning for Original Six Frigates 
 44 Gun Frigates 36 Gun Frigates 
Personnel   
Captain 1 1 
Petty Officers (appointed by 
Captain) 
See below under Petty 
Officers. 
See below under Petty 
Officers. 
Non-petty Officers 
(Ordinary Seamen) 
(Midshipmen) 
(Able Seaman) 
 
103a 
103a 
150 
 
90 
130b 
130b 
Marines 
(Sergeants) 
(Corporals) 
 
3 
3 
 
2 
2 
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 44 Gun Frigates 36 Gun Frigates 
(Privates) 50 40 
Petty Officers   
Clerk 1 1 
Boatswain’s Mate 2 2 
Coxswain 1 1 
Sailmaker’s Mate 1 1 
Gunner’s Mate 2 2 
Yeoman of the Gun Room 1 1 
Quarter Gunners 11 9 
Carpenter’s Mate 2 2 
Armorer 1 1 
Petty Officers   
Steward 1 1 
Cooper 1 1 
Master-at-Arms 1 1 
Cook 1 1 
Marines 
(Drummer) 
(Fifer) 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
aIndicates total number of Ordinary Seaman and Midshipmen equal 103 for 44 gun frigates.  bIndicates total number of Midshipmen 
and Able Seaman equal 130 for 36 gun frigates.  Adapted from “Naval History and Heritage website,” by Lester B. Tucker, 1993. 
The first attempt to establish the precedence of petty officers in the Navy was 
instituted in 1853 under the U.S. Navy Regulations.  Initially, the regulations were 
approved by the President on February 15, 1853, but were eventually revoked by the 
Attorney General in May that same year, as Congress was required to approve these 
regulations.  An important caveat to note was the fact that the order of precedence on the 
muster roll call often determined the petty officer hierarchy.  Until 1863, there was no 
instruction for ratings or rank structure.  Servicemen were paid based on their value to the 
Navy.  The only true divide amongst petty officers prior to 1863 was the two categories 
they were distributed under, Petty Officers of the Line and Petty Officers of the Staff.  On 
March 12, 1863, U.S. Navy Regulations detailed the precedence of ratings as per the 
following statement provided by the Naval History and Heritage website: 
Precedence among petty officers of the same rate, if not established 
particularly by the commander or the vessel, will be determined by 
priority of rating.  When two or more have received the same rate on the 
same day, and the commander of the vessel shall not have designated one 
of that rate to act as a chief, such as chief boatswain's mate, chief gunner's 
mate, or chief or signal quartermaster, their precedence shall be 
determined by the order in which their names appear on the ship's books.  
And precedence among petty officers of the same relative rank is to be 
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determined by priority of rating; or in case of ratings being of the same 
date, by the order in which their names appear on the ship's books. 
(Resources and Research, FAQs, Chief Petty Officer, para. 7, 1993) 
In 1865, a revised Navy Regulation gave Commanding Officers the authority to designate 
precedence amongst petty officers of the same rate.  This system was utilized for 
advancement until 1968, when the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) Manual 
published Change No. 17 in August 1968.  This revision by BUPERS executed the 
following, “precedence among ratings was eliminated and changed to a single system for 
military and non-military matters based on pay grade and time in grade” (Naval History 
and Heritage, Resources and Research, FAQs, Chief Petty Officer, para. 8, 1993). 
Executed July 1, 1864, General Order No. 36 listed all the Navy ratings and the 
monthly pay for each.  Some of the early maritime ratings included various ratings within 
the Boatswain’s Mate rating, Gunner’s Mate rating, and Quartermaster rating.  Of these 
ratings, each included Chief Boatswain’s Mate, Chief Gunner’s Mate, and Chief 
Quartermaster (often known as Signal Quartermaster until 1885).  Using “Chief” in these 
early ratings was to help designate the different assignments each rating was responsible 
for during this period.  These titles were used throughout the next 29 years with different 
variations of each rating coming and going based on the function of a petty officer. 
The earliest known use of the term “Chief” occurred during the Revolutionary 
War aboard the USS Alfred.  The USS Alfred operated during the early years of the 
Continental Navy.  Jacob Wasbie was a Cook’s Mate serving aboard the USS Alfred and 
“was promoted to ‘Chief Cook’ on June 1, 1776.  Chief Cook is construed to mean Cook 
or Ship’s Cook, which was the official rating title at that time” (Naval History and 
Heritage, Resources and Research, FAQs, Chief Petty Officer, para. 2, 1993).  The 
following excerpt talks about the first use of the term “Chief Petty Officer.” 
The term “Chief Petty Officer” was first used in connection with the 
Master-at-Arms rating.  As early as 1865, Navy regulations stated: The 
Master-at-Arms will be the Chief Petty Officer of the ship in which he 
shall serve.  All orders from him in regard to the police of the vessel, the 
preservation of order, and obedience to regulations must be obeyed by all 
petty officers and others of the crew.  But he shall have no right to 
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succession in command, and shall exercise no authority in matters not 
specified above. (History of the Chief Petty Officer Rate, para. 8&9, 2009) 
This title of “Chief” that was given to the senior Master-at-Arms Petty Officer aboard a 
ship was one of function or positional title, rather than rank. 
Until 1885, there was no official document that designated the various enlisted 
rates.  On January 8, 1885, Navy Regulation Circular No. 41 was implemented.  The 
main classifications that came out of this regulation were that petty officers and Seaman 
(non-petty officers) were designated as first, second, and third class.  There were also 
three classes; Seaman, Special, and Artificer that were established along with the 
Marines.  Notice several ratings have “Chief” within their title, but no CPO rank had 
been established to this point.  Table 5 illustrates this new rank structure and classes. 
Table 5.   U.S. Navy Regulations Circular No. 41 
U.S. Navy Regulation Circular No. 41 
  Seaman Class Special Class Artificer Class Marines 
PO1 Chief Boatswain's 
Mate  
Chief Quartermasters 
Chief Gunner's Mate 
Master-at-Arms 
Equipment 
Yeoman 
Apothecaries 
Paymaster's 
Yeoman 
Engineer's Yeoman 
Ship's Writers 
School Masters 
Band Masters 
Machinist's 1st Sergeants 
PO2 Boatswain's Mate 
Quartermasters 
Coxswains to 
Commander-in-Chief 
Ship's Corporals 
Ship's Cooks 
Chief Musicians 
Boilermakers 
Armorers 
Carpenter's 
Mates 
Blacksmiths 
Sailmaker's 
Mates 
Water Tenders 
Sergeants 
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U.S. Navy Regulation Circular No. 41 
  Seaman Class Special Class Artificer Class Marines 
PO3 Captains of Forecastle 
Captains of Main Top 
Captains of Mizzen 
Top 
Captains of 
Afterguard 
Coxswains 
Quarter-Gunners 
Seaman-Gunners 
Captains of Hold Printers, 
Painters, 
Oilers 
Corporals 
SN1 Seamen 
Seaman-Apprentices 
1st class 
Lamplighters 
Jack-of-the-Dust 
Buglers 
Musicians 1st class 
Tailors 
Barbers 
Fireman 1st class 
Carpenters 
Caulkers 
Musicians 
Orderlies 
SN2 Ordinary Seaman 
Seaman-Apprentices 
2nd class 
Baymen 
Musicians 
Fireman 
1st class 
Privates 
SN3 Landsman 
Apprentices 1st class 
Apprentices 2nd class 
Apprentices 3rd class 
Boys 
 Coal Heavers  
Adapted from “Chief Petty Officers Academy History website,” by Tom Jansing, 2010. 
From 1885 to 1893, there is no evidence that the Chief Petty Officer rank was 
established.  In February 1893, the Chief Petty Officer rank came to fruition as stated in 
the following passage. 
But then an executive order issued by President Benjamin Harrison dated 
25 February 1893 and issued as General Order No. 409 of 25 February 
1893 gave a pay scale for Navy enlisted men.  It was divided into rates and 
listed CPOs.  Both the executive order and Circular No. 1 listed Chief 
Petty Officer as a distinct rate for the first time and both were to take 
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effect on 1 April 1893.  It appears that this is the date on which the Chief 
Petty Officer rate actually was established. (History of the Chief Petty 
Officer Rate, para. 13, 2009) 
Figure 1 is a copy of General Order No. 409 signed and executed by President 
Benjamin Harrison on February 25, 1893, followed by Figure 2, U.S. Navy Regulation 
Circular No.1, which officially established the classification of chief petty officer on 
March 13, 1893.  Both the executive order and U.S. Navy Regulation Circular No.1 were 
made effective April 1, 1893. 
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  Adapted from “Goat Locker website; CPO Resources; General Order No. 409,” by direction of executive order, 1893. 
Figure 1.   General Order No. 409 
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The inaugural chief petty officer classification included only eight ratings as 
Figure 2 indicates, and was divided among three branches as follows: Seaman Branch 
(four ratings), Artificer Branch (two ratings), and Special Branch (two ratings). 
 
 
Adapted from “Goat Locker website; CPO Resources; U.S. Navy Regulation Circular No.1,” by direction of executive order, 1893. 
Figure 2.   U.S. Navy Regulation Circular No. 1 
There is no one person who is known as the first Chief Petty Officer.  Nearly all 
sailors carrying the rating of Petty Officer First Class in 1893 were automatically 
“advanced” to the Chief Petty Officer rating.  The development of rating badges and the 
gold foul anchor is worth noting, as it is such an important part of the CPO uniform 
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today.  The original rating badge worn came from the Master-at-Arms rating badge, 
which had three chevrons, an eagle, and three arcs (known as rockers today).  This led to 
the origin of the CPO chevron, which has a single rocker and became official in 1894.  
The CPO uniform first displayed the foul anchor as a cap device in 1905.  The gold foul 
anchor as a collar device became an official component of the CPO uniform in 1959.  
The 1893 rating badges and insignia for chief petty officers can been seen in Appendix C. 
3. Development of Compensation System (Pay Grade) 
After the CPO rating was established, the pay scale remained non-existent until 
the formal structuring of the pay grades was established in 1920.  “The act of May 18, 
1920, effective January 1, 1920, standardized pay at all levels from the lowest non-rated 
grade, which was Apprentice Seaman, through Chief Petty Officer” (Naval History and 
Heritage, Resources and Research, FAQs, Chief Petty Officer, para. 24, 1993).  
Throughout the Navy’s pay grade history, different variations have been utilized.  In 
1922, “the pay grades of 1 and 1-A to 7 were established” (Naval History and Heritage, 
Resources and Research, FAQs, Chief Petty Officer, para. 24, 1993).  Eventually, in 
October 1949 the Career Compensation Act was established.  The significance of this Act 
led to the reversal of pay grades (7 being more senior, a chief, and 1 being less senior) 
and the letter “E” was added to the pay grade vernacular for enlisted personnel.  Hence, 
the pay grade structure was E-1 through E-7 (Apprentice Seaman to Chief Petty Officer).  
The pay grades E-8 and E-9 did not exist.  These two senior most enlisted pay grades will 
be discussed in the subsequent section.  For further details on the Career Compensation 
Act of 1949, refer to Appendix D.  Table 6 details the U.S. Navy’s current enlisted pay 
grades and titles that coincide with each other. 
Table 6.   Enlisted Pay Grades and Titles 
Pay grade Title 
E-9 Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) 
E-9 Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) 
E-8 Senior Chief Petty Officer (SCPO) 
E-7 Chief Petty Officer (CPO) 
E-6 Petty Officer First Class (PO1) 
E-5 Petty Officer Second Class (PO2) 
E-4 Petty Officer Third Class (PO3) 
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Pay grade Title 
E-3 General Apprenticeship (No Abbreviation) 
E-2 General Apprenticeship, Apprentice (No Abbreviation) 
E-1 General Apprenticeship, Recruit (No Abbreviation) 
Adapted from “Navy Personnel Command (NPC), MILPERSMAN 1223–010 Enlisted Pay grades and Titles website.” by NPC, 2008. 
4. Establishment of Master Chief and Senior Chief Petty Officer 
The establishment of the E-8 and E-9 pay grades, better known as Senior Chief 
Petty Officer (SCPO) and Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) were a result of many 
years of rank congestion, retention, and playing a larger technological role in the Cold 
War.  Additionally, senior enlisted could often find higher wages in the civilian or private 
sector.  The creation of E-8 and E-9 became a foregone conclusion.  The following 
excerpt explains how the pay grades E-8 and E-9 were created through Public Law 85–
422. 
The Defense Advisory Committee on Professional Technical 
Compensation (commonly called the Cordiner Committee) was created in 
March 1956 "to study a possible adjustment to the existing pay structure" 
for retention purposes.  On 8 May 1957 they recommended to the 
Secretary of Defense that pay grades E-8 and E-9 be created in all the 
services.  The recommendations of the Cordiner Committee were 
introduced to Congress in several forms.  In 1958, legislation called the 
Kilday Bill was passed, became Public Law 85–422 and established the E-
8 and E-9 pay grades in the U.S. Armed Forces. (Non-commissioned 
Officer History, para. 1, 2008) 
The original percentage of E-8s and E-9s was 1.5 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively.  
These numbers were later shifted to one percent for E-9s and two percent for E-8s.  
Eligible SCPO candidates had to have four years in grade and ten years of service, while 
MCPO candidates had to have six years minimum service as a CPO and 13 total years of 
service.  The first promotions were made effective in November of 1958 based on the 
results of the examinations given in August 1958.  After the first few promotion cycles, 
the Navy mandated in 1959 that promotion to E-9 must channel directly through E-8 
only. 
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5. Brief History on Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) 
The Office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy has been in existence for 
over 43 years.  Since the inception of the MCPON office in 1967, there have been 12 
MCPONs, the most recent being, MCPON (SS/SW) Rick D. West.  The Office of the 
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy was established to bridge the gap between the 
enlisted personnel on the deck-plates and officer leadership.  The deck-plate concerns and 
what senior leadership perceived were not aligned.  The Navy established the Senior 
Enlisted Advisor of the Navy to address these concerns and ensure communications were 
clear, up and down the chain of command.  The first Senior Enlisted Advisor of the Navy 
was GMCM (Master Chief Gunner’s Mate) Delbert D. Black.  He was selected to serve a 
four year term starting on January 13, 1967, ending on April 1, 1971.  The official title of 
the office was changed to Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy on April 28, 1967.  
MCPON Black reported directly as the senior enlisted advisor to the Chief of Naval 
Personnel (CNP); all other 11 MPCONs have reported to both the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) and CNP. 
The following two passages give reference to the importance of the MCPON as 
written by the late Admiral (ADM) Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr. and spoken by Admiral 
(ADM) Carlisle Albert Herman Trost, both former CNOs, from the Winds of Change by 
Charlotte D. Crist. 
When the Office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy was 
created in 1967, the U.S. Navy took a giant step forward in untapping the 
leadership capabilities of its enlisted force.  In the act of adding an extra 
gold star to a master chief’s crow, the senior levels of command were, in 
effect, saying to the enlisted community, we respect and value your 
opinion, we need your input, and we will listen and act. (Zumwalt, 
foreword from Winds of Change, p. iv, 1992) 
No matter what we think is the reality of a situation, there is probably 
another reality on the deck plates, and our people need and deserve leaders 
who know what the reality is.  The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy 
is chartered to observe and act, not to supersede the regular chain of 
command, but to strengthen it and make it work better.  His or hers are the 
experienced eyes that can see the reality of the deck plates.  Indeed, he is 
the pulse-taker of the command. (Trost, on the occasion of the MCPON 
change of office, p. 1, 1988) 
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Refer to Appendix E to view the insignia of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.  
Of note, the MCPON wears three stars on his uniform, slightly different from the 
everyday master chief, who wears two stars.  A complete list of MCPONs is detailed in 
Appendix F.  Appendix G provides a detailed list of the MCPON Leadership Mess, 
which includes Fleet, Force, and Command Master Chiefs at major headquarters.  The 
MCPON Leadership Mess consists of four FLTCMs, 16 FORCMs, and 60 CMDCMs.  
B. NAVY RATINGS 
This section will give a brief description on Navy ratings and how they have 
impacted the Navy’s manpower.  There is an enormous amount of information on Navy 
ratings, categories, and Navy Enlisted Classification (NECs) codes.  The author will limit 
this section, with a greater importance on discussing the particular ratings of the 
participants in this study as well as the CMDCM (Command Master Chief) rating, due to 
its relevance in this study. 
1. Ratings 
A Navy rating identifies the enlisted persons field of expertise; it only applies to 
petty officers, E-4 and above.  Each rating is essentially an occupation that consists of 
specific skills and abilities utilized to perform a job.  Each rating has its own specialty 
badge which is worn on the left sleeve by all qualified men and women in that rating.  
Unofficial ratings came about upon the inception of the Continental Navy in 1775.  
During the early years, sailors did jobs based on the requirements of their particular ship.  
As jobs became more engrained in the daily activities, titles were adapted, leading to the 
basis and eventual inception of petty officers and ratings in the Navy. 
The Navy’s enlisted rating system has developed for over 230 years, resulting in 
the evolving rating system the Navy has today.  Ratings evolve as dictated by the overall 
mission of the Navy changes.  Meaning, as new equipment, techniques, and technology 
come aboard, the Navy must change to sustain a competitive advantage over their allies 
and enemies alike.  A great example of this is how the Navy has shifted from steam to 
gas turbine engines on numerous ships (the Navy also has diesel ships, and nuclear run 
ships and submarines).  The rating for this particular example in recent years has gone 
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from Boiler Technician (BT) to Machinist Mate-Surface (MM) for remaining steam ships 
and to Gas Turbine System Technician (GSE - Electrical and GSM - Mechanical) for gas 
turbine ships. 
Enlisted ratings are separated into four categories.  These categories are 
essentially based on pay grade and occupation.  The four categories of ratings are 
explained in Table 7.  This study primarily focuses on Compression Ratings such as 
FLTCM, FORCM, and CMDCM.  
Table 7.   Navy Rating Categories 
Navy Rating Categories 
1. General Ratings (Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Approved):  Identify personnel 
from pay grades E-4 through E-9.  They provide the primary means of identifying billet 
requirements and personnel qualifications.  Each rating has a distinctive rating badge. 
2. Service Ratings (Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Approved):  These are 
subdivisions of certain general ratings.  Service Ratings identify required specialization 
and specific areas of qualifications in the utilization and training of personnel.  The rating 
badge for a Service Rating is the same as that for the General Rating. 
3. Compression Ratings:  Identify the combining of several General or Service Ratings 
at pay grade E-9 to form broader career fields when the occupational content is similar.  
These ratings exist only at the E-9 level and are not identified previously as a General or 
Service Rating. 
4. General Rate:  Identify personnel occupationally in pay grades E-1 through E-3. 
Adapted from “Navy Personnel Command (NPC), Chapter III Navy Ratings and Entry Series NECs website.” by NPC, 2010. 
Appendix H gives a detailed list of occupational fields and ratings that are 
associated with each field.  Appendix I gives a complete list of each enlisted rating along 
with a picture of each specialty mark that indicates the rating. 
2. Ratings of the Participants in This Study 
This study involved 19 master chief participants, 17 active duty and two retired.  
Of the 19, there are 14 different ratings this group has donned (ET NUC - two, YN - two, 
HM - three, SK - two, and the remaining ratings had one).  The participants in this study 
represent approximately 23 percent (14/61) of the ratings, the U.S. Navy has today.  Each 
participant either currently wears (non-CMDCM/FLTCM/FORCMs), or has worn one of 
the ratings listed in Table 8, before they became a FLTCM, FORCM, or CMDCM. 
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Table 8.   List of Current Rate and Former Ratings Representing Participants 
Current Rate Rating Prior to 
CMDCM 
Active Duty 
(AD) or 
Retired 
GSCM GS AD 
CMDCM ET NUC AD 
CMDCM YN AD 
FTCM FT Retired 
CMDCM AM AD 
HMCM HM AD 
CMDCM FC AD 
CMDCM SK AD 
CMDCM HM AD 
CTRCM CTR AD 
CMDCM EN AD 
NCCM NC AD 
CTNCM CTN AD 
CMDCM YN AD 
CMDCM CTI AD 
NDCM ND AD 
FORCM HM AD 
FLTCM SK AD 
ETCM ET NUC Retired 
 
Today, the Navy’s enlisted rating structure is essential for Navy Manpower 
Analysis Center (NAVMAC).  According to Military Personnel Manual 
(MILPERSMAN) 1221–030, NAVMAC’s mission statement is, “tasked to collect, 
process, and analyze occupational information involving job content and tasking of 
enlisted ratings and officer specialties within the Navy” (MILPERSMAN 1221–030, 
2008, p. 1).  The rating structure plays a key role in detailing, career development, 
advancement, training, and overall strength planning for the Navy.  Many ratings no 
longer exist; however, Boatswain’s Mate (BM), Quartermaster (QM), and Gunner’s Mate 
(GM) have survived the numerous changes and evolution of ratings.  Through the years, 
the Navy has utilized over 100 ratings, with 61 remaining in use today. 
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C. PRESENT DAY MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER 
1. Mission 
The mission of the chief petty officer (CPO) is best stated according to the Chief 
Petty Officer Mission Statement.  “Provide leadership to the Enlisted Force and advice to 
Navy leadership to create combat-ready Naval Forces” (CPO Guiding Principles, para. 1, 
2009).  Simply put, CPOs strive to lead the enlisted men and women of the naval forces, 
along with providing recommendations to the officer leadership, which will create a 
culture and standard of performance that will lead to sustained, mission-ready forces. 
2. Vision 
The vision of the chief petty officer is best stated according to the Chief Petty 
Officer Vision Statement. 
A senior enlisted force that serves first and foremost as Deck-plate 
Leaders committed to developing Sailors and enforcing standards; remains 
responsive, aligned and well-connected to both Leadership and Sailors; 
and conducts itself in a consistently professional, ethical and traditional 
manner. (CPO Guiding Principles, para. 2, 2009) 
The chief petty officer vision is leadership, as they are committed to developing the 
enlisted manpower and creating a culture with higher standards that all sailors will be 
held accountable to maintain.  Manpower is the chief’s greatest asset, developing and 
coaching subordinates will create better technicians and sailors alike today, and future 
leaders for tomorrow.  Chief petty officers are the link between officer leadership and 
enlisted forces.  Combining their experience and knowledge, enables CPOs to train and 
mold young sailors and officers, as well as offer sound advice to senior leaders to 
promote more informed decision making.  Maintaining high standards from the realm of 
ethics, professional knowledge, traditions, and everyday operations has cemented the 
chief petty officer’s vision. 
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3. Guiding Principles 
There are seven guiding principles that chief petty officers must actively utilize as 
their approach in leading and aiding in accomplishing the mission and vision of the 
United States Navy.  They are as follows: Deck-plate Leadership, Institutional and 
Technical Expertise, Professionalism, Character, Loyalty, Active Communication, and 
Sense of Heritage.  The guiding principles are best summarized in Table 9 as per the CPO 
Guiding Principles. 
Table 9.   CPO Guiding Principles 
CPO Guiding Principles 
Deck-plate Leadership – Chiefs are visible leaders who set the tone. We will know the mission, 
know our Sailors, and develop them beyond their expectations as a team and as individuals. 
Institutional and Technical Expertise - Chiefs are the experts in their field. We will use 
experience and technical knowledge to produce a well trained enlisted and officer team. 
Professionalism – Chiefs will actively teach, uphold, and enforce standards.  We will measure 
ourselves by the success of our Sailors.  We will remain invested in the Navy through self-
motivated military and academic education and training and will provide proactive solutions that 
are well founded, thoroughly considered, and linked to mission accomplishment. 
Character – Chiefs abide by an uncompromising code of integrity, take full responsibility for 
their actions and keep their word.  This will set a positive tone for the command, unify the Mess, 
and create esprit de corps. 
Loyalty – Chiefs remember that loyalty must be demonstrated to seniors, peers and subordinates 
alike, and that it must never be blind.  Few things are more important than people who have the 
moral courage to question the appropriate direction in which an organization is headed and then 
the strength to support whatever final decisions are made. 
Active Communication – Chiefs encourage open and frank dialog, listen to Sailors and energize 
the communication flow up and down the chain of command.  This will increase unit efficiency, 
mission readiness, and mutual respect. 
Sense of Heritage - Defines our past and guides our future.  Chiefs will use heritage to connect 
Sailors to their past, teach values and enhance pride in service to our country. 
Adapted from “CPO Guiding Principles, para. 2.” by Goatlocker website 2009. 
D. SUMMARY OF CPO HISTORY AND PREVIEW OF EARNING THE 
GOLD FOUL ANCHORS 
The history of the chief petty officer is approaching 117 years of existence.  The 
duties and leadership of the CPO continue to evolve as the threats and challenges to 
America are ever-changing.  It is essential that CPO leadership strive to live by the CPO 
Guiding Principles.  There are innate forces that challenge these principles on a daily 
basis.  Senior enlisted leadership must show unflappable fortitude to each challenge and 
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understand the importance of the leadership role they perform in the U.S. Navy.  The 
mission and vision statements that are set forth revolve around the CPO ranks aligning 
officer leadership and enlisted forces to maximize resources for sustained, superior 
mission-ready operations from the deck-plate up.  These “core” values have determined 
and will continue to determine the direction and shape senior enlisted leadership will take 
in the coming years.  This study focuses on senior enlisted leadership and whether or not 
the current leadership methods can sustain the Navy into the 21st century.  The remaining 
chapters provide qualitative evidence of what the future holds for senior enlisted 
leadership in America’s great Navy. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF EARNING THE GOLD FOUL ANCHORS 
“The dictionary is the only place that success comes before work.  Hard work is the price 
we must pay for success.  I think you can accomplish anything if you’re willing to pay the 
price.” – Vince Lombardi 
A. CAREER PATH 
Earning the rank of E-7 (Chief Petty Officer) is arguably the greatest milestone 
achievement for an enlisted person.  Becoming a chief petty officer (CPO), not only 
cements a career of accomplishment, but directly anoints them as a senior enlisted leader 
within the Navy and the command they serve.  This chapter serves as an additional 
function to the foundation for explaining the data analyses that are represented in the 
results chapter of this study.  The overview of earning the gold foul anchors details the 
career path of the chief petty officer.  The explanation is generic as numerous people 
have achieved the rank of CPO through the years.  There is no, one career path that 
outlines how to achieve the pay grade of chief petty officer and beyond. 
1. Progressing Through the Ranks 
Earning the right to wear the gold foul anchors does not come easy.  A sailor must 
persevere, take the tough jobs and do well while serving in that capacity, and must be 
willing to wait for the honorable opportunity of becoming a chief petty officer.  Table 10 
is an abbreviated version of the enlisted minimum requirements for promotion in the 
Navy.  These minimums are established by the Department of Defense (DoD) and must 
be met before being considered for advancement.   
Table 10.   Navy Enlisted Minimum Requirements for Promotion 
Pay 
grade 
E–1 to 
E–2 
E–2 to 
E–3 
E–3 to 
E–4 
E–4 to 
E–5 
E–5 to 
E–6 
E–6 to 
E–7 
E–7 to 
E–8 
E–8 to 
E–9 
Time-in-
Grade 
(TIG) 
9 months 9 months 
as E-2 
6 months 
as E-3 
12 
months 
as E-4 
48 
months 
as E-5 
48 
months 
as E-6 
60 
months 
as E-7 
36 
months 
as E-8 
Adapted from “Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS).” by TAFMS website 2010. 
There are special circumstances when individuals may be promoted outside these 
guidelines, as discussed in the following excerpt. 
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Provisions exist for early advancements.  An early advancement candidate 
is one who does not meet the TAFMS (Total Active Federal Military 
Service) minimum service requirement.  No more than 10 percent of the 
total number of sailors in pay grades E-7, E-8, and E-9 may have less than 
the prescribed TAFMS.  Therefore, a limited number of early selectee 
quotas are available to the selection board.  CNO (Chief of Naval 
Operations) planners check the TAFMS and inform the board of the 
percentage of early advancements allowed by the Navy in meeting DOD 
restrictions.  The percentage is an overall board figure, not a quota by rate.  
Some panels, or “tables” within the selection board may recommend more 
selectees.  They base their recommendations on the average time in 
service for each rating, which varies yearly. (Drewry, p. 53, 2007) 
The average enlisted person is advanced to CPO around 12–14 years of service.  Refer to 
Appendix J for a more detailed outline of the enlisted minimum requirements for 
promotion. 
2. CPO Board Selection Process 
Prior to a board convening, a Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) is 
sent out from the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), with specific business rules and 
guidelines.  Generally, this NAVADMIN includes such guidelines as the convening date 
of the board and rank that is under consideration for the next higher pay grade. 
The selection process for CPO eligible members is arduous, involving an 
extensive review of a service member’s record by approximately 65–70 officers and 
enlisted board members, while taking into account the quotas available for each rating.  
The maximum quotas per rating are established by manpower planners from CNP.  The 
board may not exceed set quotas outlined by the planners; however, the board may 
recommend less than the maximum quotas if a rating does not have enough “best and 
fully qualified” candidates.  The selection board is convened by the Chief of Naval 
Personnel.  Each year an instruction, called a precept, is prepared for the board.  The 
precept outlines the selection process and gives general guidance to the board regarding 
such selection criteria as rating (each rating is addressed individually by a rating panel) 
and equal opportunity considerations.  The precept varies only slightly from year to year.  
The oath administered to board members and recorders upon convening, is contained in 
the precept.  The precept also outlines the expected conduct and performance of persons 
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serving with the board.  The board members are appointed by the CNP and, as indicated 
by the following excerpt, this appointment is to be taken extremely seriously with great 
reverence by all board members.  Of note, the fourth sentence truly drives this point 
home. 
I have personally appointed the members of this board.  During the board 
process the personnel assigned as board members work directly for me, 
under oath.  Board members are entrusted with selecting the future 
leadership of the Navy.  The performance of these duties will have a 
greater effect on the future of the Navy than any other duty they perform.  
During the board process, all other duties of an assigned member are 
secondary to the board process, and the utmost care will be given to ensure 
the process is not compromised or rushed to accommodate outside 
concerns.  Each record reviewed represents years of service by the 
individual candidate.  It is absolutely essential that our evaluation afford 
each eligible candidate fair and equitable consideration. (CNP, Letter to 
the President of the FY-10 Active Duty Navy Chief Petty Officer 
Selection Board, para. 3, 2009) 
The enlisted board members hail from nearly every rating, including Command 
Master Chief’s (CMDCM), with former rating expertise, which provides a relevant aspect 
of appropriate selection criteria, during that particular board cycle.  The mission of a CPO 
selection board is rather simple; select the best, most fully qualified, First Class Petty 
Officers (PO1) who have clearly demonstrated the potential for service at the next higher 
pay grade.  It is important to note, CPO selection includes not only requirements of time 
in service, superior evaluations, and rating examinations, but of possible more 
importance, this selection carries an added requirement of peer review.  As discussed 
previously, a chief petty officer can only advance after review, followed by a 
recommendation by the selection board.  This board includes senior officers (O-5 and 
above) and master chief petty officers, in effect, “choosing their own” and conversely not 
choosing others. 
a. General Board Information 
With all the moving variables involved in the board selection and 
members, there is a team concept that must be developed, and all differences must be put 
aside for the betterment of the service members.  For all teams, there are common periods 
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of forming, storming, norming, and performing (Smith, FY-10 Chief Petty Officer 
Selection Board Power Point, 2009).  Each phase’s duration varies, depending on several 
variables, such as familiarity, personalities, and leadership, to name a few.  The board 
members convene for approximately a week, and the days are very long, lasting 
approximately 12 hours.  The early stages involve establishing standardized grading 
criteria with a score sheet, screening records, and developing a plan of action that will 
ensure completion by the scheduled end-date. 
b. Board Process 
There are three distinct phases of the board process: individual record 
screening, the crunch zone, and slate approval.  Prior to any of the records being viewed, 
each rating group panel determines the point value their panel will utilize during the 
selection process.  This gives the panel a method to weigh each element, resulting in 
more consist grading for each panel.  The panels are divided into rating group panels, 
based on ratings.  All panels make-up the selection board. 
The first phase is the individual record screening.  In this phase, all of the 
records are independently scored at least twice, taking the average score.  If there is less 
than a 100 point differential between the two scores, the record is satisfactory.  If there is 
greater than a 100 point differential, then the two graders must discuss the scores, coming 
to an agreement below the 100 point differential.  A third independent grader will 
determine the final score, if the two graders cannot agree on a differential less than 100 
points.  Once records are weighed with no scoring discrepancies, a “working ladder” is 
established, ranking candidates in order, strictly from highest to lowest (averaging two 
scores). 
The second phase is the crunch zone.  The “crunch zone” is determined 
after the score “ladder” is identified.  This essentially is the “cut-off” where the point 
total considered high enough, is based on the results of the ladder score, making a 
particular score significant.  The “ladder” is best explained in the following three 
sentences.  Once crunch zone discussions are completed, the candidates are arranged in 
order from highest to lowest based on a vote by all the board members.  This is called the 
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“ladder.”  There are a series of ladders: one is established once the average score is 
decided, another is established for the crunch zone, and a final ladder is established for 
selection to aid with discussion. 
For simplicity, this example will allow the selection board panel, 50 slots 
to fill.  Selection is not as easy as drawing a line at record 50 and automatically selecting 
the top 50 highest scores.  There is a need to discuss and compare the records to ensure 
the best and fully qualified candidates are selected for advancement.  This leads to the 
“crunch zone.”  The crunch zone includes the top 50 records and an unspecified number 
of records below 50.  This may be the next 10–20 records, and is usually determined 
where there is the greatest point difference.  This point difference and the point total are 
determined by each board, essentially creating the scale.  Normally, the scores are very 
tight for the top records with differences within a .5–1 point range.  Where there is a 
significant point difference between records (two or more points), the panel will agree to 
“draw the line” (panel officer makes the final decision after a discussion by the panel) 
and “crunch” all records above the line.  For this example, the line could be at 65, 15 
below the top 50.  All records now in the crunch zone are discussed and reviewed as 
needed to determine which of the 65 are the “best and fully qualified.”  This can be 
detrimental for those with a higher score, as they may slide off the list.  This is in large 
part due to where the points came from, such as education and awards, as opposed to 
leadership experience and command impact, among others.  The quota limit plays a 
significant role during this phase of the selection process.  Those sailors that fall on either 
side of the quota limit are considered again through deliberations to ensure the 
recommended CPO selectees are truly the best, most fully qualified candidates for E-7. 
The third phase is the slate approval.  When the slate is briefed, “the entire 
board receives a brief on the rating’s structure, its job, its peculiarities, the number of 
candidates considered, and the backgrounds of those people recommended and not 
recommended for selection.  During this briefing, no names are given” (Chief Petty 
Officer’s Manual, p. 55, 2007).  Omitting names reduces bias for board members that 
may know a candidate.  The slating generally involves the last select versus the first three 
non-selects.  Board members review the strengths and weaknesses of these candidates, 
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acting as a self-check to make certain the best, most fully qualified sailors are selected.  A 
board must accept a slate by majority, in order for it to pass.  If slate fails twice, it is sent 
back to the board to revise for another deliberation. 
Some of the generic enhancers (strengths) and detractors (weaknesses) of 
the candidates that a board may observe are listed in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Factors for Candidates Eligible for E-7 Promotion 
Factors for Candidates Eligible for E-7 Promotion 
Enhancers 
• Sustained, superior performance 
• Demonstrate quantified leadership (other services, civilians, coalition forces, etc.) 
• Individual Augmentee (IA) assignment, gave competitive advantage for breakout 
• Taking challenging billets (especially doing sea duty to sea duty) 
• Sailorization tours (instrumental in educating and developing sailors; RTC (Recruit 
Training Command), A/C schools, Recruiting) 
Detractors 
• Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) or Court-Martial 
• Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA) failure 
• Essentially any other negative documented misconduct or administrative action, other 
than NJP 
• Lack of breakout among peers 
Adapted from “FY–10 Chief Petty Officer Selection Board Power Point.” by CMDCM (SW/AW) Russell 
Smith, 2010. 
The final recommendations are completed as follows: 
All members sign a written report of the board’s recommendations and 
submit it to the Chief of Naval Personnel for approval.  The report must 
certify that the board followed all instructions and directions in the precept 
and carefully considered the case of every candidate. (The Chief Petty 
Officer’s Manual, p. 55, 2007) 
Upon approval by the CNP, a NAVADMIN message outlining each rating of CPO 
selectees is released to the fleet. 
3. Continuation Boards 
Senior Enlisted Continuation Boards (SECB) are designed to optimize quality 
manpower in the senior enlisted ranks.  These boards are held annually to review the 
records of eligible master chiefs, senior chiefs, and chief petty officers.  A senior enlisted 
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person must have 20 years of service (YOS) and three years, time-in-grade (TIG) to be 
eligible for a continuation board.  “Members not selected for continuation must transfer 
to the Fleet Reserve or retire” (Navy.mil, CNP Provides Update for Senior Enlisted 
Continuation Boards, para. 8, 2009).  The Continuation Board panel rewards members 
based on the criteria the Navy desires, as mentioned in the following statement. 
Performance is the priority.  Board members will be looking for those 
master chiefs, senior chiefs and chiefs who have the ability to get positive 
results.  Additional consideration will be given to senior enlisted leaders 
who achieve success through leadership and personal performance while 
fostering well-trained enlisted and officer teams. (Bureau of Naval 
Personnel. (BUPERS), Senior Enlisted Continuation Board Fact Sheet, 
para. 3, 2009) 
Some of the detractors that a panel would consider damaging include: substandard 
performance, misconduct, and failure of a physical fitness assessment (PFA).  The 
following explains the board participants. 
Board member composition will be comprised of a flag officer president 
plus at least one captain from the surface, submarine and aviation 
communities as well as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.  
Captains will serve as panel heads while additional panel officers, 
typically O-3 and above, will assist panel heads in a manner similar to the 
enlisted advancement boards.  Selected active-duty and full-time-support 
(FTS) force, fleet and command master chiefs will serve as board 
members, and selected active-duty and FTS master chiefs will serve as 
recorders. (Navy.mil, CNP Provides Update for Senior Enlisted 
Continuation Boards, para. 6, 2009) 
The Navy held its inaugural SECB in September 2009.  This board retained more 
than 97 percent of the Navy’s CPOs, substantiating the strength of the CPO Mess.  As 
stated, by Vice Admiral (VADM) Mark Ferguson, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), “the 
overwhelming continuance of our senior enlisted demonstrates the extraordinary quality 
of the chief petty officer mess” (Navy.mil, Navy Retains More Than 97 Percent from 
Senior Enlisted Continuation Board, para. 2, 2009).  MCPON Rick West provided 
commentary on the board results as well. 
There were chiefs with adverse information in their records, and many of 
them are staying.  That, in itself, should tell any doubters that there was no 
quota, and that we are not a zero defect Navy.  People make mistakes.  
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Often times, it's how we respond after those mistakes that defines us as 
chiefs, as Sailors and as leaders in our Navy. (Navy.mil, Navy Retains 
More Than 97 Percent from Senior Enlisted Continuation Board, para. 7, 
2009) 
Continuation Boards for senior enlisted are in their infant stages, but will remain 
vital to the Navy’s force shaping of its senior enlisted sailors.  These boards will serve as 
verification that the Navy values quality senior enlisted leaders who will continue to train 
and develop the sailors of tomorrow. 
4. Evaluations 
Fitness reports or performance evaluations essentially convey the performance of 
sailors during their time in the Navy.  A sailor is generally evaluated once per year.  
Several other circumstances exist that require evaluations to be done more than once a 
year, such as a sailor detaching from his/her command, adverse (Non-judicial Punishment 
- NJP) evaluations, and several other occasions.  Evaluations are arguably the most 
important aspect of a service member’s record.  These evaluations speak to the superior 
or substandard performance sailors have accumulated during their careers.  Evaluations, 
as a segment of a sailor’s record, represent a sailor when the sailor goes before a 
promotion board, among other things.  Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) must understand how 
to write, interpret, and review evaluations to maximize not only their careers, but just as 
important, if not more important, the careers of those serving under them. 
The most recent version of the CPO evaluation was initiated and executed by 
former Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Joe R. Campa Jr.  The newest 
version of E-7 through E-9 Evaluation and Counseling record (CHIEFEVAL) was 
implemented in September 2008.  Prior to 2008, CPOs were evaluated using the same 
criteria (categories) as officers.  The CHIEFEVAL focuses primarily on the Chief Petty 
Officer Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles.  The purpose of restructuring the 
evaluation process for CPOs is explained in the following passage by former MPCON 
Campa. 
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The CHIEFEVAL ensures our chiefs are evaluated based on the 
expectations we've traditionally had of them.  The guiding principles 
reaffirmed those expectations.  Incorporating them as performance traits 
was the next logical step in a process we started almost two years ago. 
(Navy.mil, New CPO Evaluation Takes Effect This September, June 
2008) 
Implementing of the CHIEFEVAL signals that the CPO Mess is intent on refocusing 
their efforts back to the basics of deck-plate leadership.  The CHIEFEVAL complements 
the new performance traits, altering approximately 25 percent of the previous fitness 
report (FITREP).  The evaluation may have changed in 2008, but the duties and 
responsibilities for the CPO remain since the inception of the CPO nearly 117 years ago.  
Table 12 lists the FITREP and CHIEFEVAL differences from the performance traits 
sections (block 33–39 on each form).  This distinct difference is necessary, as the CPO in 
reality, is quite different from an officer.  These performance traits highlight the CPO 
Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles, allowing for better alignment of CPO 
expectations, selection, and evaluation.  By pinpointing these traits, CPOs will be graded 
not only on the devotion to their principles, but the effectiveness in which they carry 
them out. 
Table 12.   FITREP and CHIEFEVAL Differences 
FITREP and CHIEFEVAL Differences 
BLOCK FITREP (Performance Trait) CHIEFEVAL (Performance 
Trait) 
33 Professional Expertise Deck-plate Leadership 
34 Command or Organizational 
Climate/Equal Opportunity 
Institutional and Technical Expertise 
35 Military Bearing/Character Professionalism 
36 Teamwork Loyalty 
37 Mission Accomplishment and 
Initiative 
Character 
38 Leadership Active Communication 
39 Tactical Performance Sense of Heritage 
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Refer to Appendix K for the latest version of the officer Fitness Report (FITREP), 
Naval Personnel (NAVPERS) 1610/2, and Appendix L for the Chief Evaluation 
(CHIEFEVAL), Naval Personnel (NAVPERS) 1616/27, which became effective in June 
2008, by direction of the CNP via NAVADMIN 176/08.  Refer to Appendix M to view 
NAVADMIN 176/08. 
B. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
1. Leadership Training 
Leadership training is an ongoing experience for both officer and enlisted service 
members that aspire to be great leaders.  Formal training is essential to reinforce effective 
leadership practices, as well as introduce fresh ideas and methods to implement.  One of 
the best approaches to honing leadership skills is through on-the-job training.  Experience 
develops skills and provides a leader with the opportunity to make key decisions that will 
only enhance his/her overall leadership.  A key comment on CPO leadership experience 
was best stated in an interview with Fire Control Technician Master Chief (FTCM) Dan 
Niclas (ret.), “learn from best, what to do; learn from worst, what not to do.” 
Formal leadership training in the Navy starts at the E-4 pay grade.  The first 
exposure an enlisted person gets to leadership training is through Petty Officer Selectee 
Leadership Course (POSLC), which was developed to support sailors selected for Petty 
Officer Third Class (PO3).  This training was implemented in 2006 as a requirement for 
unit training, and must be completed prior to a petty officer being frocked (donning the 
next pay grade based on selection of promotion). 
The Navy’s leadership continuum builds on previous formalized training courses.  
E-5 (Petty Officer Second Class, PO2) and E-6 (Petty Officer First Class, PO1) sailors 
are required to take training on enlisted leadership development.  This was developed as a 
result of the success of the implementation of the CPO Selectee (2007) and Petty Officer 
Selectee Leadership (2006) Courses.  The goal is improve deck-plate leadership.  This 
training is the responsibility of the sailor’s command to provide an opportunity to grow 
and develop their enlisted leadership.  Again, the footprint of the CPO is evident, as 
stated by VADM Ferguson (CNP), “I expect Command Master Chiefs and the Chiefs’ 
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Mess to step forward and execute this training to provide our new selectees with more 
effective and more relevant leadership training” (NAVADMIN 272/08, para. 1, 2008). 
The requirement for Work Center Supervisor Leadership Course (WCSLC), no 
longer exists to participate in the E–6 advancement exam.  The Petty Officer First Class 
Selectee Leadership Course (PO1SLC) and Petty Officer Second Class Selectee 
Leadership Course (PO2SLC) both include two phases.  “Selectees must complete phase 
one of the PO1SLC/PO2SLC at their respective command prior to frocking.  PO1s/PO2s 
will then complete phase two prior to the date of the first advancement pay increment of 
the respective examination cycle” (NAVADMIN 272/08, para. 5&6, 2008).  These 
courses are designed to coincide with a sailor’s promotion (selection and advancement).  
By completing this training, all leadership advancement requirements will be fulfilled, as 
well as cost effective (local training, reduces manpower costs) for the Navy. 
There are two primary leadership courses for CPO Selects and CPOs.  For the 
CPO Selects, there is Chief Petty Officer Selectee Leadership Course (CPOSLC), which 
was implemented in 2007 and includes two phases.  Phase one is CPO Indoctrination and 
phase two focuses on the CPO Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles.  The second 
phase presents situational scenarios that help sharpen leadership skills.  The CPOSLC is 
mandatory for all Chief Selects prior to their frocking.  For the CPO Mess, there is 
monthly Chief Mess Training (CMT), revised in 2007.  All of these courses are provided 
by Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and Center for Personal and 
Professional Development (CPPD), which can be found on Navy Knowledge Online 
(NKO). 
Additionally, select CPOs, all Senior Chief Petty Officers (SCPOs), and Master 
Chief Petty Officers (MCPOs) who are eligible, attend the Senior Enlisted Academy 
(SEA) in Newport, Rhode Island.  The SEA has two different curricula according to the 
SEA website, “the resident curriculum is a six-week course of instruction, containing 240 
academic hours. The non-resident curriculum includes four to five months (108 hours) of 
distance learning and a two-week in-house course of instruction” (Senior Enlisted 
Academy, Academy Overview, para. 4, 2010). 
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Those selected for Command Master Chief (CMC)/Chief of the Boat Leadership 
Course (COBLC) must attend the CMC/COBLC prior to reporting to their first 
CMC/COB (Chief of the Boat) assignment.  The CMC/COBLC is two weeks and is held 
in Newport, Rhode Island.  All CMCs and COBs must complete the Senior Enlisted 
Academy Course (SEAC) prior to enrolling in the CMC/COBLC.  Potential waivers may 
be granted for leadership courses, but ultimately, must be completed by the responsible 
individual at his/her earliest convenience. 
2. Senior Enlisted Academy 
The senior chief and master chief petty officer pay grades were developed as a 
result of many years of rank congestion, retention, and playing a larger technological role 
in the Cold War.  The Navy’s senior leadership also wanted to create an incentive to keep 
CPOs beyond 20 years, mainly for the valuable role they filled.  In 1979, Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Admiral (ADM) Thomas B. Hayward made monumental strides to 
expand the role of senior enlisted leaders.  ADM Hayward saw the role of senior chiefs 
and master chiefs developing into a middle management position, as a replacement for 
senior technicians.  With a shift in focus for the Navy’s senior enlisted leaders, ADM 
Hayward and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Thomas Crow knew 
education and training would be essential for a successful transition from technician to 
middle manager.  Through MCPON Crow’s personal and forceful drive, the Senior 
Enlisted Academy (SEA) was founded in 1981.  MCPON Crow believed the Senior 
Enlisted Academy would re-establish pride and professionalism across the fleet. 
The SEA is one of the most well-respected, enlisted educational institutions for all 
military branches in the United States, and is the only professional military institution for 
the Navy’s senior enlisted.  The SEA is located in Newport, Rhode Island and focuses on 
leadership and management, communications skills, national security affairs, Navy 
programs, and physical readiness.  The SEA trains nearly 1,200 students annually, most 
of which are active duty Navy.  The remaining complement of students comes from other 
U.S. military branches (including reserves) and international service members.  The SEA 
curriculums are mentioned in the preceding section.  The SEA was built on “leadership 
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by example,” in keeping, largely due to the actions of “Chief Watertender Peter Tomich, 
who earned the Medal of Honor for his actions on the USS Utah (AG-16), 7 December 
1941, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii” (Senior Enlisted Academy, Academy History, para. 3, 
2010). 
All CMCs and COBs must complete the Senior Enlisted Academy Course 
(SEAC) prior to reporting to their first CMC/COB assignment.  This requirement was 
established in 1995, by CNO, ADM Jeremy Michael Boorda.  According to SEA’s 
website, “the mission of the United States Navy Senior Enlisted Academy is to strengthen 
senior enlisted commitment to professional excellence and mission accomplishment 
through education” (Senior Enlisted Academy, Academy Mission, para. 1, 2010).  The 
SEA’s vision is, “to be the Navy’s premier academic institution, educating tomorrow’s 
senior enlisted leaders” (Senior Enlisted Academy, Academy Vision, para. 1, 2010). 
All participants in the present study, with the exception of one, attended the 
Senior Enlisted Academy.  Those who pursued being a Command Master Chief or Chief 
of the Boat attended the CMC/COBLC, if it was available during their transition. 
C. CONCLUSION OF EARNING THE GOLD FOUL ANCHORS 
This chapter serves as a reminder of the complexity and fortitude it takes to earn 
the gold foul anchors.  Understanding the board process and scrutiny that goes into the 
advancement of the senior enlisted leader gives a sincere appreciation of the high quality 
senior enlisted that the Navy produces.  The average CPO dons the gold foul anchors in 
approximately the 12–14 years of service (YOS) range.  Annual evaluations 
(CHIEFEVALS) and continuation boards provide the Navy with legitimate analysis tools 
to measure the performance of our senior enlisted, ensuring they are leading from the 
deck-plate.  Continuous training and education creates a wealth of knowledge and 
provides mentoring and leadership opportunities for the CPO community, emphasizing 
the elite senior enlisted leadership positions that lead the Navy’s commands. 
The following chapter focuses on the data analysis, extracting key leadership 
variables and themes that will either sustain, or possibly impede Naval Operations in the 
future. 
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V. RESULTS 
“Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power.” 
- Abraham Lincoln 
A. OVERVIEW 
To understand key leadership characteristics used to complement behaviors that 
are frequently observed within highly effective senior enlisted leaders, interviews were 
conducted with diverse and highly qualified master chief petty officers (MCPO).  The 
goal of the interviews was to gather data to better understand the workings of senior 
enlisted leaders and the characteristics that will sustain future Naval operations.  A total 
of 19 MCPOs (17 active duty, two retired) were interviewed individually by means of 
telephone (one interview was conducted in person), varying from 45 to 100 minutes.  
Results were similar across the participants, but each interview presented a different 
perspective and experience, which led to a richer study of the senior enlisted leader. 
B. THEMES 
First, it is worth mentioning that these themes were recurring and reflect most of 
what the participants stated during the interview process, but are not all inclusive.  
Themes from the MCPO’s interviews are described below. 
1. Mission First–Sailors Are Always Imperative to Sustain Naval 
Operations 
The Naval Personnel Command (NPC) vision was substantially endorsed by all 
interviewees.  The MCPOs understand that mission is critical, but high quality resources 
(sailors) that are efficient and cost effective are necessary to accomplish the mission.  The 
Navy must continue to recruit, retain, and build the force for tomorrow on today’s bright 
up and coming sailors.  The master chiefs that represent this study understand this all too 
well, as they were the talent that was fostered yesterday to be the Navy’s leaders today.  
Today’s environment is dynamic, volatile, and fast paced.  The Navy must remain 
vigilant to the environment; it will undoubtedly remain a function of our force. 
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Each MCPO was humble, appreciative of his/her position, and wanted to be a part 
of something greater than him or herself.  The data convey that each MCPO understands 
the total force environment that the Armed Forces operate in today.  The NPC vision was 
endorsed in some manner, by 100 percent of the participants.  This theme was evident in 
the statement by Fleet Master Chief (FLTCM) Scott Benning, in regard to what his 
experience has taught him.  His statement symbolizes what each person represents in the 
Navy, a sailor, and as sailors we come together to accomplish the mission. 
Sometimes we grow up in the enlisted community and feel like there is a 
black hole there.  If you are an officer, you are in a black hole, and what I 
learned is that officers and senior enlisted people have the same desire, the 
same motivation, and it’s about serving each other, it’s about doing well; 
it’s about making the team successful.  So, there is no difference in 
between any of us, other than the fact that we carry different rank and 
different responsibilities.   
2. The Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Is the Lynchpin That Binds the Officer 
and Enlisted Ranks 
The data leave no question that the CPOs are the lynchpin that binds the officer 
and enlisted communities.  All of the interview participants were adamant that one of the 
major roles for the CPO is to bridge the gap between the enlisted and officer.  The CPO 
must connect the deck–plate with senior leadership to ensure the mission is executed in 
an effective manner.  This theme represents the core of the Navy, which is, CPOs execute 
the policy and mission put forth by the officers.  The CPO is not only the lynchpin 
between the officer and enlisted communities, but the experience and wisdom they impart 
is paramount in the development of the junior sailors and junior officers.  The CPO is the 
backbone of the Navy, as the data indicate.  This theme was embodied by the statement 
of Cryptologic Technician Collection Master Chief (CTRCM) Johnny Hutson. 
Strong commands have a strong CPO Mess.  They are experienced 
individuals with expertise and leadership skills.  No matter whom you are 
E-1 thru O-10; the anchor is a sign of reliability and support.  If taken 
away, a void will exist.  The CPO is the lynchpin; it binds and strengthens 
a command. 
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3. The Importance of the CPO Mess Cannot Be Understated 
The CPO Mess provides an enormous advantage for the Navy.  The data clearly 
present why the CPO Mess is essential to each command and the Navy as a whole.  The 
CPO Mess has great camaraderie and the ultimate “TEAM” (Together Everyone 
Accomplishes More) attitude, led by the Command Master Chief (CMDCM).  
Networking and utilizing other CPO resources are common practice among CPOs, 
ensuring the mission is accomplished.  All participants (100 percent) believed the loss of 
the CPO Mess would be monumental and even catastrophic to Naval operations.  The 
majority of the interviewees had confidence in the Navy’s sailors that they would 
persevere and find a way, as that is the way of a sailor, but a solution would not be easy 
and would take time to come to fruition.  This theme was personified through the words 
of Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Jackie DiRosa when she was asked about the 
importance of the CPO. 
I have told many people and including my Chiefs Messes this, when I 
have talked to them about their responsibilities and level of engagement, 
which is required under command—and I’ve told them, …I can take all 
the officers out of the command and the job is still going to get done.  I 
said if I take you out of the command, then we’re going to suffer—
because it is not necessarily the officer’s role to do the day-to-day 
execution—it’s the chief’s role to do that, to train and develop our junior 
sailors and deliver the requirements of that command and that mission.  
So, you take that chief petty officer out of that picture, what ends up 
happening, is you create more chaos—and you know what, it will be 
crippling.  Now, and you can see the difference when you take a command 
that is highly successful, whether it is an operational or shore command, 
you take a command that is highly successful and line them up against a 
command that is not—and I will tell you, nine times out of 10 the issues 
lie in the Chiefs Mess.  If the Chiefs Mess is not engaged and not taking 
action, proactive action in the command, the command suffers as a whole. 
One violation or derailment by any particular CPO Mess is a violation of the Mess 
as a whole, and is detrimental to all CPOs, Navy-wide.  CPOs are supposed to be above 
reproach and have the utmost integrity.  The CPO’s role is to lead by example 24 hours, 
seven days a week in every capacity.  It is important to note that CPOs are people like 
anyone and susceptible to shortcomings, but the CPOs moral fiber and character must be 
second to none and one to emulate.  If a CPO fails, he or she loses credibility and the 
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capacity to lead his or her people.  This destroys unit cohesiveness; therefore hindering 
the mission that a CPO is appointed to execute.  During a recent interview with one of the 
master chief participants they reflected on the consequences of poor leadership and 
judgment by the CPO Mess. 
Failure is not an option sir, and when we fail, it is horrible.  The JAMES E. 
WILLIAMS that you probably heard or read in the “Navy Times” on that is 
huge, for five chiefs to be admin sep due to fraternization.  The CO 
[Commanding Officer] relieved and the CMC [Command Master Chief] to 
be relieved that is a failure in leadership and a failure on that Chiefs Mess, 
which is a black eye against all the Chiefs Mess. 
Finally, the CPO Mess and the role of the CPO are unique to the U.S. Navy.  
Command Master Chiefs (CMDCM) and Chiefs of the Boat (COB) have unfettered 
access to the commanding officer and the executive officer, unlike most mid-level 
management positions in the civilian or private sector.  The other military services do not 
have a role that is equivalent to the CPO, and this is evident from the example that was 
alluded to during an interview with one of the master chief participants. 
I will tell you that the other Branches of Service don’t have what we have.  
As a master chief, I have direct access to a one star in the Army who calls 
me up and bounces things off of me—because the first time that I met her 
and briefed her on some stuff, she started asking my opinion, and I not 
only gave my opinion on the topic at hand and my opinion on some other 
stuff that their office held accountability and responsibility for—and her 
Army Sergeant Major who was sitting behind her—jaw about hit the floor 
and after it was all said and done, he pulled me aside and said, I can’t 
believe you told the general all of that.  I’m like, why not?  He said, in the 
Army, you just don’t do that—and I said, well, she opened the door. 
4. Chief Petty Officers Are Ultimate Team Builders Who Train and 
Develop the Ranks of Today for the Future of the Navy 
The data, without a doubt, provide clear evidence that the CPO rank structure is 
essential to growing the Navy’s ranks from within.  All (100 percent) of the participants 
of this study understand their role as a CPO is to train and develop junior enlisted, peers 
(junior CPOs), and junior officers.  The CPO plays a unique role in developing 
subordinates that eventually fill the ranks.  The Navy, as in all military services, grows, 
trains, and develops their own talent.  This talent is developed through a team 
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environment, predicated on education and training.  The experience the CPO provides is 
undoubtedly the core to fostering each sailor’s growth and, eventually leads those 
motivated sailors to realize their potential.  There are various roles a CPO fills that will 
give him or her opportunity.  As a division chief they certainly have this chance, but their 
role becomes more multifaceted as the level of responsibility is enhanced.  The 
opportunities are too vast to detail in this study, but the role of the CPO can be unlimited 
depending on the individual and his or her desire and potential.  The CPO role comes to 
life in the following account from one of the master chiefs represented in this study. 
If you look at the CPO Creed and listen to folks talk about—MCPON 
[Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy] Campa really coined the term, 
deck-plate leaders.  When he talked about that deck-plate leader that 
means getting out on the deck-plate, getting out from behind your desk, 
quit sending those e-mails out and talking to your sailors via e-mail.  Get 
out and walk and look at them [your sailors] in the eye.  My thing is that 
we’re supposed to be visible leaders, ok—visible—we set the tone.  As my 
SG [Surgeon General] always says to me, he says, FORCE, you’ve got to 
be out there listening to what the sailors are saying that’s the job of the 
chief.  Right now, in the Navy we’ve got high deployment/high suicide, 
we’ve really got some issues and that chief, whether they believe it or not, 
can make a difference in a young sailor’s life because the sailors that are 
coming in today are very different than when I came in 30 years ago.  
You’ve got to be able to change your leadership style to understand the 
young sailors we have coming in today.  They are different; what they 
want, they want, and they want it right now.  So, that chief is that visible 
leader out there and I think if that is gone, you will lose something in 
translation. 
5. Mastering the Realm of Expertise Will Lead to Credibility and 
Success Through Experience and Walking the Walk 
The data (the majority of the interviewees) validate that a high quality leader must 
walk the walk and lead by example.  A senior enlisted leader cannot expect his or her 
sailors to do something they have never done before.  The experience of going down a 
similar career path and having done a particular task, pays enormous dividends for senior 
enlisted leaders when it comes to garnering respect from subordinates and understanding 
expectations.  Being a senior enlisted leader is often predicated on credibility; the 
moment one’s credibility is lost, they lose those they are leading.  This is one of the 
primary reasons why the CPO is vital to the ranks of the Navy.  CPOs, by and large have 
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the experience and technical expertise to lead a group of sailors with relative ease.  There 
is a sense of comfort when a young sailor sees his or her chief alongside them teaching 
and mentoring, and possibly walking them through the task at hand, if needed.  This 
process strengthens the CPOs credibility and sends a distinct message that the chief cares 
and has the knowledge and experience to lead that young sailor.  Senior enlisted leaders 
must be ready for any challenge, and the fact that they are looked at to set the example in 
all facets of leadership.  Master Chief Navy Diver (NDCM) Paul Balesi addressed 
leading by example in a simple, but rather important manner. 
Leadership by example that everybody says, but it really does work, I 
think.  I am the first guy at work in the morning and the last guy to 
leave—and they [sailors] will never see me out of uniform, needing a 
haircut, or shave.  Anything like that it’s automatic stuff I’ve carried 
through since military school, since I was a kid—I just make a good 
example for the kids. 
The voice of the CPO is important; each CPO must carefully choose his or her 
words, as sailors listen.  A senior enlisted leader’s voice and actions are paramount in 
building his or her credibility.  The CPO, like anyone can ruin his or her credibility with a 
slip of the tongue or an unacceptable action.  The moment a CPO says something, it is 
“perceived” as reality, whether it is true, false or has meaning or no meaning.  Command 
Master Chief (CMDCM) Jon Port speaks about the difference between leading from 
behind a desk and leading by example. 
I have learned through being a parent, things about how I would interact 
with my children and I learned over the years what was not effective—and 
because it wasn’t effective with them, then it probably isn’t any more 
effective with this 18 or 19 year-old sitting across from my desk, right 
now.  So, maybe there’s another approach, I found out, probably the 
greatest leadership attributes you can have is leadership by example.  If 
you lead by example and really lived what you said, then sailors have a 
tendency to respect that and if sailors respect you, just like your parents—
you don’t want to disappoint them—so it meant more to look across that 
desk and tell the sailor, I’m not angry at you, I’m disappointed.  If you ask 
my boys that are wearing the uniform now, they will tell you that was far 
worse; they just wanted me to yell at them.  To tell them I was 
disappointed, oh my, they had to wear that badge, like forever now.  That 
only comes if they respect you, it doesn’t work if you are sitting there 
yelling at them every day, they don’t care. 
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Becoming a technical expert and crafting one’s skill is essential to the chief petty 
officer’s credibility and providing sound leadership in their discipline.  One study 
reviewed suggests this as a significant problem of the CPO Mess (Eyer, 2010).  The 
author of this particular (thesis study) believes the decline in the level of technical 
expertise amongst chiefs is a product of the Navy going to Computer-based Training 
(CBT), leaving out the most important aspect of training and education, the personal 
interaction between the subject expert and the student.  CBT came about as a cost 
effective measure and a manner that would decrease the time spent (by a sailor) in the 
Navy’s supply (training) chain; therefore, decreasing training costs with the expectation 
that production (of that sailor) would remain relatively unchanged.  The real question that 
remains is, is this method of training going to ultimately decrease the knowledge base of 
today and tomorrow’s sailors, which will in turn deliver a significant setback to the Navy 
as a technically savvy organization? 
Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Jon Port drives home the point about the 
importance of remaining a technically sound Navy in the following passage.  His view 
was not necessarily shared by all master chiefs in this study, but it is a significant point 
worth mentioning in concern to the future challenges of the Navy.  The underlying 
message CMDCM Port is conveying, is that Chiefs never used to miss an opportunity to 
teach, whether it was about our Naval history, terms and traditions, or about a piece of 
equipment.  He believes the CPO must embrace this approach, regardless of the 
technological advances made. 
I don’t believe we are going to get any smaller, but we’re going to have to 
get smarter.  We’re getting into a position where you know we’re going to 
have to get back to where operator is not good enough.  You can’t bet on 
the fact that just technology will carry you and you don’t have to have any 
knowledge whatsoever of what’s in that box—just pull that box out and 
send it to a manufacturer that’s not going to be good enough.  You don’t 
have any clue as to why that box interacts with that box, interacts with that 
box—that’s got to be there and who leads that effort and who leads the 
Mess and who lead that enlisted man, it’s that master chief and CMC.  So, 
he’s got to get his chief petty officers back into the books, back focused on 
the technology that drives our Navy—and really knowledgeable, I mean 
no kidding knowledgeable.  If you’re a warfare pin [qualified], you got a 
warfare pin on your chest, guess what, you checked onboard my ship and 
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you’re going to re-qualify and I want you to re-qualify in a year and I’m 
going to sit the board to make sure you re-qualify.  So that chiefs can be 
the kind of technical as well as leadership mentor to those junior sailors 
that are up and coming.  We kind of have to go (back) full circle where we 
used to be.  Chiefs never used to miss an opportunity to teach.   
6. Smell Like a Sailor and Impart Through Nose-to-Nose Leadership 
Getting back to the basics under the leadership of former Master Chief Petty 
Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Joe Campa, has led to the resurgence of an emphasis on 
deck-plate leadership.  Deck-plate leadership continues to be stressed under MCPON 
West, as is evident through the words of Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Jerry 
Helton, “we [chief petty officers] need to smell like our sailors.”  This refers to the need 
of the CPO being visible and engaged in the daily operations of his or her division, while 
providing the technical advice and sound leadership to ensure the division understands 
why the mission is essential. 
Chief Petty Officers hold a unique leadership position, the fact that they lead in a 
variety of methods demonstrates their flexibility and willingness to change according to 
the situation.  Leading down is an integral part of developing the Navy’s sailors.  Chiefs 
have an innate ability to go nose-to-nose with junior sailors.  This unique leadership 
allows them to provide intense counseling sessions (some may refer to this as “tough 
love”) for subordinates, which is often quite effective.  The key to this nose-to-nose 
leadership is to pick the “precise” opportunity when the chief believes it will be most 
effective.  Subsequently, doing this daily will generally harden a sailor’s reaction 
(connection) to the message being sent by the chief.  When this leadership is utilized it is 
paramount (within a short period) in building up the sailor that the chief has just torn 
down.  This is imperative so the chief does not “lose” that particular sailor and continues 
to keep them motivated.  Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Willie Clouse was speaking 
in reference to technology and the impact it has and will continue to have on leadership 
and the personal contact element that will remain a challenge for leaders. 
I want us to keep an eye on technology—I think technology, if used right 
is a great asset—I’m talking dealing with people now, obviously, not 
weaponry or not managing ships, I’m talking us (leaders) dealing with 
people.  I think technology can really help us and it can also hurt us.  I fear 
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often times; technology is not being used as a communication tool, but 
being used to replace some form of leadership.  I think there is a big 
concern there—especially as I told you, my earlier observation that the 
generation we are bringing into the military now, they want that 
interaction, personal contact, they want to look you in the eyeball and see 
what your pupils are doing.  So, if I am talking to them via e-mail and 
scolding them or calling on a cell phone—I think I am going to lose that 
person as a sailor.  I don’t want it [technology] to replace personal 
interaction that leadership is responsible for delivering to people. 
7. Vision, Communication, and Relationship Building Are Paramount to 
Leading a Strong Command 
The data (the majority of the interviewees) support that relationship building and 
the core value it has in leading a strong command.  The roles the Commanding Officer 
(CO), Executive Officer (XO), and CMC play in each individual command are critical in 
the success or failure of that command.  These individuals are the leaders of the 
command.  They set the standard and develop the climate and culture of the command to 
ensure a positive working environment for each sailor.  Some of the most important 
aspects of the leadership triad are vision, communication, and the relationship building 
that transpires not only amongst these individuals, but also between the Wardroom and 
the Chiefs Mess.  Some of these ideals are embodied in a passage from an interview with 
one of the master chief participants. 
If I’m a leader, and the thing is that as a leader, as a chief, I’ve got to be 
able to be honest with my boss, my officer—and my officer needs to be 
able to say I need you to be honest with me and accept that criticism.  
Being the CMC is probably one of the loneliest positions that you have in 
that command—you have no friends, you shouldn’t have any friends.  So, 
you and that XO should be sitting down every morning talking to make 
sure you two are on the same sheet.  If you’re not, close the door; cuss 
each other out—so that when you do open that door nobody knows.  The 
Senior Enlisted Academy [SEA] has in every room, a saying on the wall—
acceptance does not always mean agreement.  You may not always agree, 
but when you open that door you have to accept that decision that was 
made in that room and move forward and carry out the plan of the day.  
You’ve got to do that. 
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8. Innovation and the Vision to Accept Change Will Aid in Adapting to 
the 21st Century Navy 
The data validate (the majority of interviewees) that innovation is instrumental to 
the future of the successes and/or failures of the Navy.  Today’s CPO must be willing to 
change, adapt, and have the vision to maximize resources.  The coined phrase, “do more 
with less” is a reality the Navy and other militaries cannot ignore.  The Navy’s senior 
enlisted leaders must know their sailors, along with the abilities and training that will aid 
in carrying out the mission.  Having the right person in the right job is essential.  
Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Willie Clouse shared his views on innovation during 
his interview. 
I don’t want to use that saying that we’re not suppose to use—do more 
with less, but it is out there, it’s a tough world we are living in.  I think a 
person that is happy with status quo and think they live in a static world—
I think the world is going to leave them behind and they will quickly find 
themselves not relevant to what is going on.  So, don’t change for change 
sake, but change where change needs to be implemented, and we need to 
do it, and do it quick or we’re not going to have a military of the 21st 
century.  We need to be changing all the time.  We’re in a new world, 
technology is moving faster than we can keep up with it.  By the time we 
pull something off the shelf and put it on ships, planes, or submarines, it is 
no longer relevant, it is old material—and our sailors nowadays, we’re not 
dumping anymore responsibility on them as compared to when I was a 
young second class, first class, but we sure do require them to know a lot 
more—than say I was required to know back in the late 80s and early 90s.  
Leaders need to be innovative, evaluating what we’re doing and making 
sure it remains ready, relevant, and responsive to current times. 
The responses to the question, what role does innovation play in master chief 
leadership garnered various explanations.  However, the majority of the participants said 
it was vital and the Navy needs to be keen on innovation and the role it will play in today 
and in the future.  Responses focused on manpower, the economic factor, equipment, the 
type of wars the military will fight, technology, and numerous other innovation facets of 
leadership.  One of the technological elements involves MCPON West on Facebook.  
Facebook may be an excellent tool when used correctly, but there are many dangers in 
cyberspace and social networking, whether one intends it to be or not.  For example, 
terrorist harboring unpleasant intentions on the U.S. Military could intercept the location 
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of a particular unit through devious social networking if sailors are not keen on how they 
communicate.  The MCPON also places an expectation on himself by communicating on 
Facebook, as sailors may interpret something one way and he will be held to that whether 
it is intended that way (this refers back to the CPO having to choose his or her words 
wisely).  However, Facebook is a constructive tool in launching mass communications, 
which can be useful, as long as each chain of command is utilized appropriately. 
9. Leading Up, Down, and Laterally Are Expected as a CPO 
The majority of the participants in this study stated that leading laterally was the 
most difficult type of leadership, followed by leading up, and leading down was the 
easiest.  Nearly all the participants said each role had challenges, but some were easier to 
overcome than others.  By and far, understanding who one was leading was a critical 
factor in being successful in any capacity of these leadership roles.  The following 
sections will give a summary of leading up, down, and laterally through the eyes of the 
master chief petty officer. 
a. Leading Up 
The data confirm that leading up requires particular people skills and 
communication skills to succeed at leading one’s boss.  Leading up is developed through 
years of experience and understanding the position each leader plays in the overall 
execution of the mission.  Senior enlisted leaders must have vision to stay ahead, and the 
ability to utilize their influence and experience to ensure the command is heading in the 
right direction.  For example, the Command Master Chief (CMDCM) of any Navy 
command has unfettered access to the commanding officer as his or her confidant.  It is 
important that senior enlisted leaders are a sounding board and understand when to give 
candid recommendations to senior officers and have the courage to tell the emperor they 
have no clothes on.  The expectations of senior officers are fierce and patience is a virtue.  
Leading up is most prevalent at the MCPON, FLTCM, FORCM, CMC, and COB levels.  
These positions are generally filled with the best talent the enlisted community has to 
offer, resulting in success, the majority of the time. 
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Leading up takes a certain craft or technique to be effective, especially 
within the confines of the military rank structure.  This technique literally takes years to 
develop and master for the senior enlisted leader.  For instance, as a seaman, fireman, 
airman, or undesignated sailor, an enlisted sailor learns to negotiate with tact.  The more 
junior a sailor, the less negotiating and more executing of orders from superiors, such as, 
the Work Center Supervisor (WCS), Leading Petty Officer (LPO), LCPO (Leading Chief 
Petty Officer), or in seldom events, a sailor’s Division Officer (DIVO).  As a sailor 
garners more seniority the requirement for these skills becomes more of a necessity to be 
effective at leading up, they essentially function in parallel with each other.  Furthermore, 
the opportunities for negotiating (with superiors) stem from requesting more liberty (time 
off from duty) time, ideas at work that may be more innovative to increase production, or 
getting involved with command responsibilities and creating a better command climate, 
as well as numerous other circumstances.  This pattern continues as a sailor promotes to 
more senior pay grades to earn the gold foul anchors (in this example), eventually 
promoting to master chief petty officer (MCPO). 
The master chief is well seasoned in all regards.  He or she has earned the 
title master chief through knowledge, experience, and the process of aging (maturation).  
The master chief’s only “true” (similar in age and time in service) peer is often the 
commanding officer (CO).  The CO understands to trust his or her CMDCM (will use for 
this example) with substantial responsibilities.  This CO/CMDCM relationship has been a 
component of the Navy for quite some time.  The following passage provides a reference 
to the creation of the Command Master Chief. 
In 1971 Adm. Bud Zumwalt, at the urging of MCPON Whittet, issued a 
“Z-gram” formalizing the program, which identified the “best and 
brightest” as master chief petty officers of the command (MCPOC).  
Twenty-three outstanding master chief petty officers were identified and 
assigned to major commands ashore and afloat. (Leahy, p. 134, 2004) 
The official Command Master Chief (CMC) Program was initiated through 
OPNAVINST 1306.2C (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction).  The 
following excerpt gives an explanation of the duties of the CMDCM. 
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The Navy's Command Master Chief (CMC) Program is a valuable asset 
which stimulates free-flowing communications and ensures the highest 
standards of professionalism are upheld at all levels within the chain of 
command.  Command Master Chiefs strengthen the chain of command by 
keeping the Commanding Officer aware of existing or potential situations 
as well as procedures and practices which affect the mission, readiness, 
welfare and morale of the Sailors in the command.  CMCs are the senior 
enlisted leaders who report directly to their respective Commanding 
Officers.  They formulate and implement policies concerning morale, 
welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization and training of Navy 
personnel.  By reporting directly to their Commanding Officer, the CMCs 
keep their chain of command aware and informed of sensitive and current 
issues. (OPNAVINST 1306.C, Command Master Chief Program, 1995) 
Through these distinct duties (and many others), the CMDCM harnesses power, 
respect, and unfettered access to the commanding officer.  There is a mutual respect 
between a CO and his or her CMDCM.  Military leaders are expected to lead through 
sound moral leadership, which creates direct, honest feedback, and calculated 
recommendations.  These conversations are not always pleasant, especially if these two 
individuals have different perspectives.  An effective CMDCM can harness the power of 
others (CO) to his or her advantage, ensuring mission accomplishment.  There is a fine 
line that must be tread lightly when harnessing this power.  An effective CMDCM 
masters the art of listening and directs it in his or her favor when negotiating or making 
valuable recommendations. 
There certainly is an art to leading up, but the fundamentals to leading up, revolve 
around understanding how to listen and learning to leverage one’s position with the 
support of accurate data to influence the decisions that will be of utmost importance to 
the command executing the mission. 
b. Leading Down 
The data validate that leading down tends to be the easiest leadership role 
to fill for a MCPO.  The majority of the master chiefs in this study felt it was rewarding 
leading down due to the training and development role they fulfill.  Leading down is an 
integral part of developing the Navy’s junior sailors. 
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Being a senior enlisted leader is often predicated on establishing 
credibility, the moment one’s credibility is lost, they lose those they are leading.  This is 
one of the primary reasons why the CPO is vital to the ranks of the Navy.  CPOs, by and 
large have the experience and technical expertise to lead a group of sailors with relative 
ease.  There is a sense of comfort when a young sailor sees his or her chief alongside 
them teaching and mentoring, and possibly walking them through the task at hand, if 
needed.  This process strengthens the CPOs credibility and sends a distinct message that 
the chief cares and has the knowledge and experience to lead that young sailor. 
Another challenge of leading down is allotting time with those junior 
sailors one needs to train and develop.  Overcoming the demands of your time spent 
leading up and laterally can be detrimental to a young sailor reaching their full potential.  
The majority of a CPOs time may be spent in meetings with other leaders or tending to 
other responsibilities within a command.  It is imperative that the CPO is visible and 
instrumental in the development of each of his or her sailors. 
The 3.0 sailor can be a CPOs greatest challenge.  Enlisted sailors (E–1 
through E–6) are evaluated based on a grading scale according to Naval Personnel Form 
(NAVPERS 1616/26 – refer to Appendix O) on a scale of 1.0 to 5.0, 1.0 being the low 
end of the scale (performance traits - below standards) and 5.0 being the high end of the 
scale (performance traits - greatly exceeds standards).  The 3.0 sailor is “average,” he or 
she “meets all 3.0 standards.”  This sailor tends to do just enough to survive and to stay 
out of trouble.  They are extremely challenging to motivate, as they see themselves 
progressing along with no real issues and are not terribly motivated to maximize their 
talent or may be limited and know that, but play the role of the 3.0 sailor to a tee.  This is 
very frustrating for a senior enlisted leader and the Perform to Serve (PTS) program is 
helping alleviate this strain to some degree, according to Vice Admiral (VADM) Mark 
Ferguson, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). 
The Perform to Serve program is an essential tool that allows us to provide 
stable and predictable manning to the fleet.  It will allow us to keep a 
balanced force based on experience, skill sets, and seniority matched to 
requirements. (All Hands 2010 Calendar: A supplement to All Hands 
magazine, June 2010) 
  59
Bringing others (lower pay grades) with you is seen as leaving no one 
behind as a senior enlisted leader.  The philosophy behind leading down in this manner is 
that as a leader you will do whatever is necessary within your power to get a shipmate to 
follow you and impart knowledge to them.  This is all part of the growing process as a 
young sailor. 
The Navy has over 60 different ratings amongst its enlisted ranks.  Some 
ratings require a higher aptitude for technical expertise and so forth, while others require 
more hands on training and familiarity with various types of equipment.  The data 
suggest that different ratings may require different leadership styles due to the propensity 
of different personalities and characteristics that may lead a sailor to choose a particular 
rating.  Leaders that tend to be more cerebral lead in a manner that is controlled through 
intellect, often challenging their subordinates to understand why a certain action is 
necessary or not.  Adversely, those leaders in lower aptitude ratings tend to be 
charismatic and lead by example (through actions), but may lack the deep intellect of 
those in the technical ratings.  However, there are many examples of leaders having 
intellect and charisma, which gives a leader more tools in their toolbox while leading. 
c. Leading Laterally 
Greater than 50 percent of the master chiefs in this study stated that 
leading laterally is the most difficult type of leadership.  Leading laterally for a master 
chief entails mentoring and training other CPOs and junior officers.  This leadership can 
be difficult for a number of reasons, some of which are: junior CPOs believe they have 
arrived (don’t have to work as hard or listen since they are now a CPO, these CPOs learn 
the difficult way or in some extremes are lost), there are various personalities and 
experiences, and understanding how to motivate each can be a serious challenge, and 
finally, many of the mid-grade and junior officers do not take counsel or hear the 
message (tough situation due to rank structure). 
A chief is held to a higher standard and the rules apply even more.  They 
must understand the big picture of the command they serve in and it is even more 
beneficial if they have a firm appreciation of the geo-political situation the United States 
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faces each day.  As a chief, one is a senior enlisted leader that has earned the right to be 
called a chief.  It is imperative that as a chief, you remain true to your roots and 
remember what got you where you are today.  This is important as it will give greater 
support to your chain of command and your input as a chief will be more valued by your 
peers, especially your MCPON, FLTCM, FORCM, CMC, or COB, making their life less 
painful.  These upper echelon leaders build their CPO Messes on communication, 
experience, and the resources each CPO brings to the Mess. 
Today’s Navy faces a dynamic and ever-changing environment.  The 
Navy needs chiefs that are willing to adapt and remain flexible to whatever challenges 
come their way.  Old habits die hard, but that does not mean an old dog cannot learn a 
new trick or two.  As a leader, having the ability to be flexible and willing to accept 
change is paramount in the environment of the world today.  Innovation will be a key to 
the future, and the Navy’s CPOs must be aligned with these strategies that will be vital to 
sustaining Naval operations.  All these factors enable the Navy’s senior enlisted to be 
unique and highly effective leaders.  Officers and chiefs must complement their senior 
enlisted leader counterparts to make the ease of leading laterally more effective for each 
command.  Combining these assets will only increase the likelihood of aligning each 
command’s goals with their mission, making efficiencies more practical to realize. 
To gain a better understanding of how the master chief thinks in regards to 
leadership, here is a brief, but robust statement from Command Master Chief (CMDCM) 
Michael Stevens, “if we want to be extraordinary leaders, we must be uncommon 
ourselves; do those things not typically seen, driven by self discipline.” 
C. SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS 
This chapter addressed the themes that were developed through listening to the 
interviews and extracting the key elements of each interview that were important to the 
uniqueness of the CPO and enriching this study.  These themes were evident in the 
majority of the interviews conducted.  However, there are more themes that could have 
been extracted with all the vast experience and years of service these high quality master 
chiefs brought this study.  The summary, conclusion, and recommendations for this study 
will follow in the subsequent chapter. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“A leader takes people where they want to go. A great leader takes people where they don't necessarily 
want to go but ought to be.” – Rosalynn Carter 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to examine unique and innovative leadership 
characteristics of the senior enlisted leader with a focus on master chief petty officers 
(MCPO).  The data were generated through utilizing a qualitative methodology of in-
depth interviews with 19 master chiefs that were deemed particularly successful.  The 
majority of the participants were Command Master Chiefs (CMDCM) tallying over 504 
years of total service and 144 years at the rank of Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO).  
The following is a summary of the major findings from the interviews, revolving around 
unique and innovative characteristics. 
1. Command First, Person Second 
• The Navy is the ultimate team, led by various levels of senior officers that 
create and direct the strategy for the senior enlisted to execute (carry out the 
mission). 
• Through this relationship a team is built with multiple layers and 
functions.  The most applicable team to this particular study is a command. 
• The data show that chief petty officers (CPO) understand the importance 
of command first, person second.  They are the team builders within each 
command, led by the Command Master Chief. 
2. The CPO Mess Is the Core of the Navy 
• The chief petty officer is the lynchpin that binds the officer and enlisted 
ranks; he or she is the direct connection from the deck-plate to senior leadership. 
• The CPO’s wealth of knowledge, experience, and innovative vision are 
crucial in leading from the front as the driving force of the Navy. 
• The camaraderie and unlimited networking of CPOs are an immeasurable 
advantage for the Navy. 
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3. Deck-Plate Leaders 
• Deck-plate leadership will continue to be vital in connecting the junior 
sailors with the Navy’s strategic vision and mission, through the guidance of the 
CPO. 
• The CPO must be visible and engaged in the daily operations of his or her 
division, while providing the technical advice and sound leadership to ensure the 
division understands why the mission is essential. 
• Leadership by example is a must for CPOs, as this helps build credibility 
through actions and re-enforces their ability as leaders and technical experts. 
4. Experience and Age Lead to Seasoned Leaders 
• As a senior enlisted leader, the CPO is afforded a unique leadership 
position with the expectation of leading up, down, and laterally 
• In a leading up capacity, the MCPON, Fleet Master Chiefs (FLTCM), 
Force Master Chiefs (FORCM), Command Master Chiefs (CMDCM), and Chief 
of the Boats (COB), which are regarded as premier senior enlisted billets, have 
unfettered access to either a Flag-Officer (FO) or the Commanding Officer (CO) 
at their respective commands. 
• Leading down, CPOs, led by the CMDCM are charged with developing, 
training, and mentoring junior enlisted sailors as well as junior officers.  The 
CPO’s experience and knowledge plays a significant role in earning credibility 
and respect.  The nose-to-nose leadership implemented with the junior enlisted 
sailor is paramount in developing each sailor’s potential. 
• Leading laterally, the data show this is the most difficult style of 
leadership for the CPO.  Leading peers, junior officers, and mid-grade officers 
can be an unappreciated task.  It is imperative that each CPO, junior officer, and 
mid-grade officer endorses the command vision and mission, to ensure leadership 
is aligned. 
• The average CPO earns the gold foul anchors around the 12–14 years of 
service (YOS) mark, positioning him or her well for the role as a senior enlisted 
leader. 
• This time spent earning the gold foul anchors is essential in providing 
experience as well as development and maturity and honing technical skills that 
will be crucial when leading as a CPO. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
There have been very few studies on the unique and innovative leadership of the 
chief petty officer (CPO) of the United States Navy.  The chief petty officer has been a 
tremendous advantage in the Navy for nearly 117 years.  The data reveal that chief petty 
officers are exceptional leaders at implementing their vast experience and knowledge, 
which enables them to adapt to numerous challenges while leading up, down, and 
laterally.  The CPO has earned the respect of superiors through visionary and candid 
recommendations, leading up; the respect of peers through brotherhood/sisterhood and 
earned credibility, leading laterally; and the respect of subordinates through deck-plate 
leadership and mentoring, leading down.  All of these unique and innovative 
characteristics of senior enlisted leaders will be critical in preparing for and solving the 
future challenges. 
1. Future Challenges for Leadership 
An important aspect of this study is the future challenges that the senior enlisted 
leaders of the Navy will face.  The data did not support any overwhelming theme in 
reference to future challenges; however, one likely challenge places the Armed Forces as 
the nucleus to solving the geo-political disputes.  The senior enlisted leader will become 
even more critical with force shaping and smart ships on the horizon. 
Force shaping will create the need for more senior operators, with less manpower 
to accomplish the mission.  Decreasing manpower leads to constraints that need to be 
given serious consideration.  Implementing smart technology onboard Navy ships will 
reduce personnel that are required to man a ship.  However, there are further 
considerations.  For example, crisis situations such as engineering main space fires 
onboard a Navy ship.  Where does the ship get the manning to fight the fire when 
technology fails?  Such issues will make the leader’s job even more vital and more 
difficult, requiring them to be more resourceful. 
Command Master Chief (CMDCM) Michael Stevens gave a detailed description 
of his thoughts on the future challenges for senior enlisted leadership.  His statement 
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alludes to both the fiscal and manpower challenges that lie ahead to ensure the Navy is 
winning through efficiencies and effectiveness.  A few excerpts from his comments 
follow:   
I believe the Navy is at a crossroads and I believe that our fiscal 
environment has expedited or forced this crossroad to come sooner than it 
otherwise would have, but I believe there is going to be a need to have a 
fundamental change in how we use our resources. 
Pareto principal is the 80/20 rule where they say, 20 percent of people 
typically do 80 percent of the work.  I believe in the military because of 
the requirements just to get in and the training we receive, it is probably 
more 30/70.  But I believe there is going to be a need to significantly 
increase the capabilities and the work ethic of each individual, not just in 
the Navy, but the Armed Forces, so that we can survive as a Service and I 
believe that is going to be one of the significant challenges we face. 
What we have to look at are those other 80 percent that have an average to 
marginal career.  How do we get those people to elevate their game 
through positive influence, creative leadership and more efficiency?  
There is going to have to be more of a fundamental change in how we 
approach this, how we train to it—how we create that climate and culture 
within our organization.  So even if it means getting five or 10 percent 
more out of everything we do, we’ve got to find a way to elevate because 
we’re no longer going to win through attrition and numbers—we’re going 
to win through efficiencies and effectiveness. 
Superior leaders will be required to deal with the increase in smart ship 
technology and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), force shaping.  Less manpower is not 
always a good thing.  Senior enlisted leaders must find a way to elevate the productivity 
of the sailors they are charged with leading to ensure the smart ship technology and LCS 
platforms are a success.  If the Navy is not willing to assess and challenge technology 
through the latest innovation, they will neglect leveraging the capabilities that are 
available to improve the overall efficiencies of their force. 
2. Recruiting and Leading the Millennials 
Recruiting and retention are always a considerable challenge.  The recent fiscal 
environment has led to better recruiting and retention of sailors.  With the uncertainty of 
the economy, the Navy’s retention may remain at or above acceptable levels.  Retention 
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is as high as it has been in recent years, but at some point the Navy will have to release 
quality people due to force shaping.  This is a good thing for the Navy as long as the 
short-term plan coincides with the long-term metrics that will produce quality force 
shaping. 
Recruiting and retention is linked to leading the Millennials into the 21st century.  
One of the primary questions policy makers need to ask is, can we keep Millennials’ 
interests and will they want to serve for 20–30 years in the same industry?  The Navy will 
welcome many of these Millennials to attrite at some point, due to manpower restraints, 
but even that small percentage that may consider a career may present a challenge for 
future planners and leaders of the Navy.  As this study has alluded to several times, 
leaders must understand their people and the particular assets and talents they offer, 
which will elevate production, efficiencies, and ultimately mission accomplishment.  
Leaders must also be willing to change and be innovative.  The following excerpt is from 
Dr. Paul Voss, who wrote the forward for Gap Odyssey by Mark D. Malis.  He references 
survival and adaptation, and ties in technology with the role it plays in changing as an 
organization. 
Charles Darwin’s famous book On the Origin of Species (1859) 
introduced the concept of evolution to the English speaking world.  In this 
book, Darwin stressed the link between adaptation and survival.  Darwin 
did not speak of the survival of the strongest; if strength and strength alone 
mattered, the huge dinosaurs would still roam the earth.  Darwin rather 
postulated the survival of the fittest, those organisms (or corporations) 
with the agility and the ability to adapt to and with the changing 
environments. 
The history of business in the United States is full of once-vital 
corporations who failed to adapt, companies that remained chained to a 
certain way of doing business with a certain technology, serving a fixed 
market.  Many of these corporations no longer exist.  But markets, as we 
know, change—they move and evolve.  As a result, so must companies.  
Naturally, so must the workforce and those managers who lead the 
workforce.  In this new environment, managers must often make the first 
and most conspicuous moves. (Gap Odyssey, p. xii, 2009) 
The willingness to adapt and change are obvious considerations for future Naval 
operations; however, the military must tread lightly, as the rules and regulations of the 
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military are different than most civilian and private sector companies.  Understanding 
what motivates a Millennial is certainly a step in the right direction, but changing an 
organization (such as the Navy) to adhere to a generation would be disastrous.  The Navy 
must be flexible but as history has shown, there are individuals with particular 
characteristics (personalities) that have a greater propensity to volunteer for military 
service.  These individuals exist in every generation, as has been proven through 
maintaining an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) since 1973. 
Master Chiefs must continue to lead from the front with unique and innovative 
leadership.  For this to occur, the Navy’s senior enlisted leadership must remain keen to 
what motivates the Millennials and understand how to leverage their numerous talents to 
contribute to mission-readiness.  The Navy’s leaders must be willing to adapt to the 
Millennials, but ensure the core and structure of the Navy remains focused on the mission 
and vision of the Navy, as an organization.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The data for this study were compiled through in-depth interviews with 
participation from selected master chiefs that were regarded as particularly successful.  
Quite possibly, further research on a larger scale may give more detailed insight into the 
unique and innovative characteristics of master chief petty officers.  Specific 
recommendations follow. 
1. Creation of the E-10 Pay Grade 
The military currently has an enlisted rank structure from E-1 through E-9, with a 
maximum years of service completed, otherwise known as high-year tenure (HYT), of 30 
years for E-9 (Master Chiefs).  Master Chiefs, as stated previously, comprise less than 1 
percent of the Navy enlisted force.  Based on the data of this study, the creation of the E-
10 pay grade for approximately .50 percent of the enlisted force may produce an 
incentive for senior enlisted leaders.  Out of an estimated 2800 master chiefs, 750 are 
Command Master Chiefs, making up approximately 27 percent of master chiefs in the 
Navy.  This would give the Navy an opportunity to reward those master chiefs that take 
on the top senior enlisted leadership positions.  These positions that would be eligible for 
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the E-10 pay grade could include: MCPON, FLTCMs, FORCMs, CMDCMs, and COBs.  
The enlisted service member would have to have had at least one successful tour in one 
of these positions to retain the E-10 pay grade.  If the master chief’s tour was not deemed 
successful for any reason, he or she would revert back to E-9.  Creation of the E-10 pay 
grade would have a trickle-down effect that would open, albeit (very few) opportunities 
down the rank structure but it may be enough opportunity to keep that talented sailor who 
otherwise would have departed the Navy.  It may also allow some of the Navy’s more 
talented chiefs to extend their career, enabling the Navy to tap into that seasoned 
leadership to benefit the entire force.  The remaining details would be deferred to policy 
makers. 
2. Education on the Uniqueness of the CPO 
The Navy needs to do a better job of educating all officers and enlisted on the 
value of the chief petty officer.  These individuals are impressive and will continue to be 
the core of our Navy.  CPOs have many vast experiences and knowledge, and the 
leadership value each CPO brings with he or she is immeasurable.  Chief Petty Officers 
truly are unique and innovative; they are arguably one of the Navy’s most valuable 
resources.  Ideally common practice, when an officer is asked a question by a junior 
sailor, should be the question, “have you asked your chief?” 
3. Future Research 
Training and education of the senior enlisted, with a primary focus on the affect 
of Computer-based Training (CBT) on technical knowledge of the CPO, should be 
studied.  One could go about this study from a 360-degree feedback perspective using 
survey data from peers, superiors, and subordinates.  The rationale would be to ask 
pertinent questions that apply directly to the technical leadership of the CPO from the 
perspective of each group (peers, superiors, and subordinates).  This study would be 
limited to technical ratings.  A second study should focus on the impact of the LCS Navy 
and smart ship technology on deck-plate leadership. 
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D. FINAL REMARKS 
In closing, the usefulness of this study lies in helping all sailors (officer and 
enlisted) who want greater knowledge about senior enlisted leadership, specifically the 
master chief petty officer.  Master chief petty officers are particularly unique and 
innovative.  They are the elite of the enlisted sailor, instrumental in policy decisions, and 
leaders from the deck-plate (leading down) to the rank of admiral (leading up).  
Moreover, they care about the welfare of their country, their sailors, and represent the 
Navy core values – honor, courage, and commitment.  The chief petty officer has been 
the “glue” to the world’s most dominating Navy for nearly 117 years.  The importance of 
the CPO role is as critical today, if not more than it was in 1893. 
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APPENDIX A.  MASTER CHIEF DIROSA’S CREDENTIALS 
Master Chief Jacqueline DiRosa was instrumental in identifying the participants 
of this study.  She is currently the Command Master Chief for Navy Information 
Operations Command (NIOC) Suitland, her seventh tour as a CMC.  Her previous billet 
and career experiences are the primary factors that qualify her to assist in such a manner.  
CMC DiRosa’s preceding billet was the director of the newly (at the time) established 
CMC Management Office.  She was asked, by then, Master Chief Petty Officer of the 
Navy (MCPON) (Jul 2006–Dec 2008) Joe Campa to stand-up the office.  The basis for 
creating this job was to assist in reducing biased selection of FORCMs/FLTCMs and 
other “Flag Level” CMCs to ensure equal opportunities were given to all qualified 
candidates.  The primary purpose of this office was to coordinate CMC slating for all 
Flag/General Officer (FO/GO) CMC assignments, and provide a list of eligible and 
qualified candidates for consideration.  This centralized a function that was previously 
done at the local command level and offered little community visibility to processes and 
selection; therefore, routinely led to an assumption that selection for top assignments was 
based on "who you know."  A large majority of Master Chief DiRosa’s job consisted of 
"career counseling," developing an understanding of the personal career desires of each 
CMC, their strengths/weaknesses, career goals, as well as providing appropriate 
recommendations to aid in attaining career milestones while taking on challenging 
assignments.  The intent was to develop a much needed "succession plan" for major 
commands and FO/GO level assignments.  Standing-up the CMC Management Office 
lasted two years, eventually succumbing, due to less than adequate financial backing. 
Master Chief DiRosa also served as the Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) FORCM 
as well as US Fleet Forces Command (USFF) FLTCM during two previous assignments.  
During these three particular tours mentioned, she worked in some capacity with each of 
the participants of the study.  She has in-depth knowledge of each participant’s 
leadership, behavior, and desire to professionally develop subordinates.  However, with 
all of the advantages Master Chief DiRosa brings to the study, using her as the primary 
source of identifying potential participants also introduces a potential bias.  Master Chief 
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DiRosa’s distinguished and lengthy career has afforded her many experiences; however, 
this study is limited by who she has served with and her biases toward certain individuals, 
as we all have inherent biases whether we want to admit them or not.  Master Chief 
DiRosa selected from a diverse number of personnel with a vast amount of experience, 
which helped reduce the selection bias. 
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APPENDIX B.  INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS 
Primary Questions: 
Theme 1. Background 
Start the Interview with an open ended softball (where were you born and raised): 
What attracted you to the Navy and what has your journey been like on your way to 
becoming a MC, also ask for rate? 
1) Have you been a CMC or COB? 
2) How long have you been in the military? 
Theme 2:  Courses 
1) Have you taken any leadership courses while on active duty?  If so, which ones and 
how have they helped? 
2) What were the most important takeaways for you from these courses? 
Theme 3: Leadership 
1) What is the importance of chief petty officers to the Navy?  What would be lost if this 
reporting structure would somehow go away? 
2) What life experiences, education, athletics, parents, on the job training, etc. have had 
the most effect on forming your approach to leadership? 
3) What characteristics/skills do you believe are essential to being a successful leader in 
the senior enlisted ranks?  What does it take to be a successful senior enlisted leader? 
4) What role does innovation play in MC leadership? 
5) Did you have any master chiefs that you looked up to as role models?  What 
characteristics did they display that you thought were most effective? 
6) Leadership typically involves managing up, working laterally with peers, and leading 
down.  Please think about how a MC leads up, down, and laterally.  What have been the 
challenges of leading up, down, and sideways?  Which has been the most challenging for 
you and what techniques have you learned that seem to be the most helpful in influencing 
each of these groups, especially those over whom you have no real authority? 
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7) If you have experience as a CMC, COB, or in the capacity of another leadership 
position that is similar, what have you found most helpful in working with officer 
leadership, so it was effective for both you and the command? 
8) Can you give any more insight into the secrets behind the chief petty officer 
community and how they actually get the job done as the enlisted leaders of the Navy? 
9) How much of being a successful master chief can be learned and how much do you 
think is innate due to a person’s personality? 
Theme 4: Industry Analog 
1) Is there an equivalent to the MC in the civilian sector? How do you feel MC’s differ 
from civilian counterparts? 
Theme 5: Career Development 
1) What jobs have been career enhancing for you?  What jobs do you feel are looked 
upon as the best for career enhancement? 
2) What advice do you have for someone that wants to become a MC? 
3) What is most important for moving up the career ladder for senior enlisted folks?  
What is most likely to derail them? 
Theme 6: Future Challenges 
1) What are the main differences if any, you see in today’s CPO vs. when you first came 
into the Navy from a leadership perspective and the role they fulfill? 
2) What challenges do you foresee senior enlisted leadership facing as the Navy changes? 
Conclusion 
1) Would you like to add any further comments or suggestions or do you have any 
questions for us/me? 
Secondary Questions: 
1) Do you have any suggestions on literature for me to review that may give me a richer 
understanding of leadership and/or senior enlisted leadership? 
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APPENDIX C.  1893 RATING BADGES AND INSIGNIA FOR CHIEF 
PETTY OFFICERS 
           
1893 Chief Master at Arms rating badge  1893–1894 Chief Petty Officer rating 
for white clothing. This style was worn   badge without a specialty mark for 
by Chief Master at Arms from 1893 through  white clothing. A specialty mark was 
1894. for white clothing. added depending on the rate. The eagle 
was white for blue clothing. 
 
  
 
1893 Chief Petty Officer cap device worn by chief petty officers from 1893–
1897. The same device was worn by first class petty officer prior to the 
establishment of the Chief Petty Officer rating in 1893. 
 
Adapted from “Goat Locker website; CPO Resources; General Order No. 409,” by direction of executive order, 1893. 
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APPENDIX D.  CAREER COMPENSATION ACT OF OCTOBER 
1949 
Executive Order 10122--Regulations governing payment of disability retirement 
pay, hospitalization, and re-examination of members and former members of the 
uniformed services 
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 10122 of Apr. 14, 1950, appear at 15 FR 
2173, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 313, unless otherwise noted. 
By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 414(b) of the Career 
Compensation Act of 1949, approved October 12, 1949 (Public Law 351, 81st Congress), 
and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the 
United States, I hereby prescribe the following regulations governing payment of 
disability retirement pay, hospitalization, and re-examination of members and former 
members of the uniformed services: 
Section 1. The terms &quotuniformed services" and &quotSecretary" as used in these 
regulations shall have the meaning prescribed therefore by subsections (a) and (f), 
respectively, of section 102 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949. 
Sec. 2. (a) Effective as of October 1, 1949, all duties, powers, and functions incident to 
the payment of disability retirement pay of members or former members of the uniformed 
services retired for physical disability or receiving disability retirement pay shall, except 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, be vested in the Secretary concerned. 
(b) Effective July 1, 1950, all duties, powers, and functions exercised by the Veterans' 
Administration pursuant to Executive Order No. 8099 of April 28, 1939, as amended by 
Executive Order No. 8461 of June 28, 1940, relative to the administration of the 
retirement-pay provisions of section 1 of the act of August 30, 1935, as amended by 
section 5 of the act of April 3, 1939, 53 Stat. 557, and amendments thereof, shall, as to 
cases within their respective jurisdictions, be vested in the Secretary of the Army and the 
Secretary of the Air Force, and thereafter the Veterans' Administration shall not be 
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charged in any case with any further responsibility in the administration of the said 
retirement-pay provisions. The said Executive Order No. 8099 as amended by the said 
Executive Order No. 8461 is hereby amended accordingly. 
Sec. 3. All duties, powers, and functions incident to the hospitalization, except as 
provided in section 5 of this order, and re-examination of members of the uniformed 
services placed on the temporary disability retired list under the provisions of the Career 
Compensation Act of 1949 shall be vested in the Secretary concerned. 
[Sec. 3 amended by EO 10400 of Sept. 27, 1952, 17 FR 8648, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., 
p. 900] 
Sec. 4. Effective May 1, 1950, all duties, powers, and functions incident to the 
hospitalization of members or former members of the uniformed services permanently 
retired for physical disability or receiving disability retirement pay shall, except as 
provided in section 5 of this order, be vested in the Secretary concerned: Provided, that 
all the duties, powers, and functions incident to hospitalization which such members or 
former members are entitled to and elect to receive in facilities of the Veterans' 
Administration, other than hospitals under the jurisdiction of the uniformed services, 
shall be vested in the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. 
Sec. 5. All duties, powers, and functions incident to the hospitalization of members or 
former members of the uniformed services placed on the temporary disability retired list 
or permanently retired for physical disability or receiving disability retirement pay who 
require hospitalization for chronic diseases shall be vested in the Administrator of 
Veterans' Affairs: Provided, that all the duties, powers, and functions incident to 
hospitalization for such members or former members who elect to receive hospitalization 
in uniformed services facilities shall, subject to the availability of space and facilities and 
the capabilities of the medical and dental staff, be vested in the Secretary concerned: And 
provided further, that for the purpose of this order, the term `chronic diseases' shall be 
construed to include chronic arthritis, malignancy, psychiatric or neuropsychiatric 
disorder, neurological disabilities, poliomyelitis with disability residuals and degenerative 
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diseases of the nervous system, severe injuries to the nervous system including 
quadriplegics, hemiplegics, and paraplegics, tuberculosis, blindness and deafness 
requiring definitive rehabilitation, major amputees, and such other diseases as may be so 
defined jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and 
the Federal Security Administrator and so described in appropriate regulations of the 
respective departments and agencies concerned. Executive Order No. 9703 of March 12, 
1946, prescribing regulations relating to the medical care of certain personnel of the 
Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (formerly Coast and 
Geodetic Survey), Public Health Service, and the former Lighthouse Service, is hereby 
amended to the extent necessary to conform to the provisions of this section. 
[Sec. 5 amended by EO 10400 of Sept. 27, 1952, 17 FR 8648, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., 
p. 900; EO 11733 of July 30, 1973, 38 FR 20431, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 792] 
Sec. 6. Except as provided in section 5 hereof with respect to hospitalization for chronic 
diseases, nothing in this order shall be construed to affect the duties, powers, and 
functions of the Public Health Service with respect to hospitalization and medical 
examination of members and former members of the Coast Guard and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (formerly Coast and Geodetic Survey) under 
the Public Health Service Act, approved July 1, 1944 (58 Stat. 682), as amended, and the 
regulations prescribed by the said Executive Order No. 9703 of March 12, 1946. 
[Sec. 6 amended by EO 11733 of July 30, 1973, 38 FR 20431, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., 
p. 792] 
Sec. 7. Nothing in this order shall be construed to affect the duties, powers, and functions 
vested in the Administrator of Veteran's Affairs pursuant to the provisions of the act of 
May 24, 1928, entitled &quotAn Act making eligible for retirement, under certain 
conditions, officers and former officers of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps of the 
United States, other than officers of the Regular Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, who 
incurred physical disability in line of duty while in the service of the United States during 
the World War" (45 Stat. 735, as amended), or by or pursuant to the act of September 26, 
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1941, entitled &quotAn Act to provide retirement pay and hospital benefits to certain 
Reserve officers, Army of the United States, disabled while on active duty" (55 Stat. 
733). 
Adapted from “Career Compensation Act of 1949,” 1949. 
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APPENDIX E.  INSIGNIA OF MASTER CHIEF PETTY OF THE 
NAVY (MCPON) 
   Sleeve         Collar 
 
          
 
The rating badge consisting of     The MCPON adds a third silver 
a silver eagle (“crow”) atop three     star above the gold anchor on 
inverted gold chevrons and rocker,     his or her collar and cap devices. 
and three inverted gold stars 
above the eagle.  The MCPON's 
rating specialty mark is replaced 
by a single inverted gold star. 
Badge 
 
 
 
He or she will also wear the 
Master Chief Petty Officer of the 
Navy Badge on his uniform. 
 
Adapted from “Wikipedia, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.” 2010. 
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APPENDIX F.  CHRONOLOGY OF MASTER CHIEF PETTY 
OFFICERS OF THE NAVY (MCPON) 
 
 
No. Name Tenure 
1 MCPON Delbert Black 1/13/1967 thru 01/4/1971 
2 MCPON(NAC/CAC) John "Jack" Whittet 1/4/1971 thru 9/25/1975 
3 MCPON Robert Walker 9/25/1975 thru 9/28/1979 
4 MCPON(NAC) Thomas S. Crow 9/28/1979 thru 10/1/1982 
5 MCPON(NAC) Billy C. Sanders 10/1/1982 thru 10/4/1985 
6 MCPON(SW) William H. Plackett  10/4/1985 thru 9/9/1988 
7 MCPON(AW/NAC) Duane R. Bushey 9/9/1988 thru 8/28/1992 
8 MCPON(SW/PJ) John Hagan 8/28/1992 thru 3/27/1998 
9 MCPON(SS/SW/AW) James L. Herdt 3/27/1998 thru 4/22/2002 
10 MCPON(SS/AW) Terry D. Scott 4/22/2002 thru 7/10/2006 
11 MCPON(SW/FMF) Joe R. Campa 7/10/2006 thru 12/12/2008 
12 MCPON(SS/SW) Rick D. West 12/12/2008 thru present 
Adapted from “Wikipedia, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.” 2010. 
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APPENDIX G.  MCPON LEADERSHIP MESS (FLEET, FORCE, 
AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS) 
 
       Adapted from “OPNAVINST 1306.2E, Command Master Chief Program.” 2008. 
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    Adapted from “OPNAVINST 1306.2E, Command Master Chief Program.” 2008. 
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      Adapted from “OPNAVINST 1306.2E, Command Master Chief Program.” 2008. 
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APPENDIX H.  OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS AND ASSOCIATED 
RATINGS 
1.   Administration (LN, NC, PC, PS, RP, YN) 
  
2.   Air Traffic Control (AC) 
  
3.   Aviation Ground Support (ABE, ABF, ABH, AS) 
  
4.   Aviation Maintenance/Weapons (AD, AE, AM, AME, AO, AT, AZ, PR) 
  
5.   Aviation Sensor Operations (AW) 
  
6.   Communications (IT) 
  
7.   Construction (BU, CE, CM, EA, EO, SW, UT) 
  
8.   Cryptology (CTI, CTM, CTN, CTR, CTT) 
  
9.   General Seamanship (BM) 
  
10. Health Care (HM) 
  
11. Intelligence (IS) 
  
12. Law Enforcement/Security (MA) 
  
13. Logistics (CS, SH, SK) 
  
14. Marine Engineering (EM, EN, GSE, GSM, IC, MM) 
  
15. Media (MC) 
  
16. Meteorology and Oceanography (AG) 
  
17. Music (MU) 
  
18. Ordnance Systems (GM, MN, MT) 
  
19. Sensor Operations (STG, STS) 
  
20. Ship Maintenance (DC, HT, MR) 
  
21. Ship Operations (OS, QM) 
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22. Special Warfare/Diving (EOD, ND, SB, SO) 
  
23. Weapons Control (ET, FC, FT) 
 
Adapted from, “Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupations Standards, Volume 1. Navy 
Enlisted Occupational Standards (NAVPERS 18068F). Appendix B Occupational Fields and Associated Ratings.” by Navy Personnel 
Command 2010. 
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APPENDIX I.  ENLISTED RATINGS 
          
        AB         AS            AD 
    Aviation Boatswain’s Mate   Air–Traffic Controller      Aviation Machinist’s Mate 
    ABE – Equipment 
    ABF – Fuel 
   ABH– Handling 
 
       
        AE           AG             AM 
 Aviation Electrician’s Mate        Aerographer’s Mate     Aviation Structural Mechanic 
   AME – Equipment 
 
     
     AO        AS          AT 
  Aviation Ordnanceman  Aviation Support Equipment Aviation Electronics Technician 
                Technician 
 
        
     AW          AZ              BM 
     Naval Air Crewmen        Aviation Maintenance  Boatswain’s Mate 
        Administrationman 
 
                 
      BU            CE      CM                CS 
    Builder Construction Electrician   Construction Mechanic   Culinary Specialist 
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                CT   DC             EA             EM 
Cryptologic Technician Damage Controlman Engineering Aide  Electrician’s Mate 
CTI - Interpretive 
CTM - Maintenance 
CTN - Networks 
CTR - Collection 
CTT – Technical 
 
               
          EN    EO              EOD                ET 
   Engineman  Equipment Operator Explosive Ordnance Electronics Techician 
               Disposal 
 
              
   FC     FT            GM               GS 
      Fire Controlman Fire Control Technician   Gunner’s Mate  Gas Turbine System 
 
        
            HM             HT       IC                         IS 
Hospital Corpsman Hull Maintenance Interior Communications      Intelligence 
      Techinican              Electrician       Specialist 
 
                
        IT               LN              LS*           MA 
Information Systems Technician        Legalman  Logistics Specialist Master–at–Arms 
 
                     
          MC            MM      MN                  MR 
Mass Communication Specialist Machinist’s Mate  Mineman Machinery Repairmen 
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          MT         MU             NC             ND 
Missile Technician    Musician  Navy Counselor      Navy Diver 
 
          
              OS    PC*     PR              PS 
Operations Specialist         Postal Clerk      Aircrew Survival         Personnel Specialist 
             Equipmentman 
 
          
          QM              RP   SB             SH 
 Quartermaster  Religious Programs Special Warfare Boat Ship’s Serviceman 
          Specialist            Operator 
 
    
        SK*       SO        ST              SW 
 Storekeeper  Special Warfare Operator        Sonar Technician        Steelworker 
              STG – Surface 
            STS – Submarine 
 
                      
       UT     YN             AN**              FN**                       SN** 
Utilitiesman        Yeoman            Airman             Fireman               Seaman 
 
*The LS rating was created Oct. 1, 2009, by merging the Postal Clerk (PC) and Storekeeper (SK) ratings.  
PC and SK Navy Reservists (E-1 to E-5) will convert to the LS rating April 1, 2010.  All PC personnel are 
required to wear the SK rating badge no later than Oct. 1, 2011. 
**General Apprenticeship 
 
Adapted from “Navy Personnel Command via All Hands 2010 Owners’ and Operators’ Manual.” by NPC, 
2010. 
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APPENDIX J.  NAVY ENLISTED MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PROMOTION 
The following chart shows the minimum requirements for Navy enlisted 
promotions in the pay grades of E–2 through E–4. 
Requirements E-1 to E-2 E-2 to E-3 E-3 to E-4 
Time-in-Grade 9 months 9 months as E-2 6 months as E-3 
School Boot Camp None A-School (for ratings with A-schools) 
BUPERS Approval 
to Participate None Required for Controlled Ratings 
PARS None PARS Required 
Performance Test None 
Selected ratings must complete applicable 
performance test before taking the Navy Service-Wide 
Advancement Exams.  
Leadership 
Training None Petty Officer Indoctrination Course 
Enlisted 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Used by Commanding Officer when 
giving promotion approval.  
Counts as performance factor in Advancement Final 
Multiple for all E-4 through E-7 candidates. 
Obligated Service 
Requirements 
There is no single set of obligated amount of service required to take Navy-wide advancement 
exams or to accept advancement to pay grade E-2 to E-6.  
Examinations 
Locally 
Prepared 
Testing 
NETPDTC Exams Navy-Wide Advancement Exams are required for all Petty Officer Pay grades   
Non-Resident 
Career Course and 
RTM 
None Required for all E-3 and Petty Officer advancements unless waived due to completion of Navy School. Courses need only be completed once. 
Recommended by 
Commanding 
Officer 
All Navy Advancements Require the Commanding Officer's recommendation for advancement 
on current evaluation. 
Adapted from “US Military.About.com, para. 4.” by US Military.About.com website 2010. 
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The following chart shows the minimum requirements for Navy enlisted 
promotions in the pay grades of E–5 through E–9. 
Requirements E-4 to E-5 E-5 to E-6 E-6 to E-7 E-7 to E-8 E-8 to E-9 
Time-in-Grade 12 months as E-4 48 months as E-5 48 months as E-6 60 months as E-7 36 months as E-8 
School NJS for rating LN2 None 
Navy School for 
ratings AGC, 
MUC, and RPC 
None None 
BUPERS Approval to Participate None 
PARS PARS Required None 
Performance Test 
Selected ratings must complete 
applicable performance test before 
taking the Navy Service-Wide 
Advancement Exams.  
None 
Leadership 
Training 
P02 Leadership 
Training Course 
Continuum 
P01 Leadership 
Training Course
Continuum 
CPO 
Indoctrination 
Course  
CPO Leadership 
Training Course None 
Enlisted Performance Evaluation 
Counts as performance factor in 
Advancement Final Multiple for all 
E-4 through E-7 candidates. 
Considered by Promotion Board when 
making promotion decisions. 
Obligated Service Requirements 
There is no single set of obligated 
amount of service required to take 
Navy-wide advancement exams or to 
accept advancement to pay grade E-
2 to E-6.  
Must remain on active duty a 
minimum of two years to retire at the 
higher pay grade. 
Examinations 
Navy-Wide Advancement Exams 
are required for all Petty Officer Pay 
grades   
Promotion to E-7 requires Navy-Wide 
Advancement Exam and selection by 
the Navy-Wide CPO Selection Board. 
Promotion to E-8 and E-9 is 
accomplished by Navy-Wide 
Promotion Selection Board, only.  
Non-Resident Career Course and 
RTM 
Required for all E-3 and Petty 
Officer advancements unless waived 
due to completion of Navy School. 
Courses need only be completed 
once. 
Non-Resident Career Courses and 
recommended readings (See 
NAVEDTRA 10052). 
Recommended by Commanding Officer 
All Navy Advancements Require the Commanding 
Officer's recommendation for advancement on current 
evaluation. 
Adapted from “US Military.About.com, para. 5.” by US Military.About.com website 2010. 
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APPENDIX K.  FITNESS REPORT (FITREP) 
 
         Adapted from “NAVPERS 1610/2 (Rev. 3-02).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
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         Adapted from “NAVPERS 1610/2 (Rev. 3-02).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
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APPENDIX L.  E-7 THRU E-9 EVALUATION AND COUNSELING 
RECORD 
(CHIEFEVAL)
 
    Adapted from “NAVPERS 1616/27 (6–08).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
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  Adapted from “NAVPERS 1616/27 (6–08).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
  99
APPENDIX M.  NAVADMIN 176/08 
TO NAVADMIN 
 
NAVADMIN 176/08 
 
SUBJ/NAVY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COUNSELING SYSTEM  
POLICY/CREATION  OF E7-E9 EVALUATION AND COUNSELING FORM// 
 
REF/A/DOC/NAVPERS 1616/27// 
REF/B/DOC/ NAVPERS 1610/2// REF/C/DOC/BUPERSINST 1610.10A/20 SEP  
05// 
REF/D/DOC/OPNAVINST 6110.H/15 AUG 05// NARR/REF A IS NAVPERS  
1616/27 
(6-08), EVALUATION AND COUNSELING RECORD (E7-E9).   
REF B IS NAVPERS 1610/2 (03-02), FITNESS REPORT AND COUNSELING  
RECORD (E7-O6).   
REF C IS BUPERSINST 1610.10A, NAVY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
SYSTEM.   
REF D IS OPNAVINST 6110.1H, PHYSICAL READINESS PROGRAM.// 
 
1.  THIS NAVADMIN INTRODUCES REF A AS THE E7-E9 EVALUATION AND 
COUNSELING RECORD (CHIEFEVAL), REPLACING THE CURRENT FITREP,  
REF B, FOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS (E7-E9). THE CHIEFEVAL  
INCORPORATES CHIEF PETTY OFFICER EXPECTATIONS AS  
PERFORMANCE TRAITS, WHICH COMPLETES ALIGNMENT OF CHIEF PETTY  
OFFICER EXPECTATIONS, SELECTION GUIDANCE, AND EVALUATIONS. 
 
2. FUNCTIONALLY, THE CHIEFEVAL AND THE CURRENT FITREP DIFFER  
ONLY IN BLOCKS 5 AND 33 THROUGH 39.  ALL FITREP WRITING GUIDANCE  
IN REF C APPLIES DIRECTLY TO THE CHIEFEVAL, WITH THE FOLLOWING  
AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
A.  FITREP PERFORMANCE TRAIT COMMAND OR ORGANIZATIONAL 
CLIMATE/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IS EVALUATED IN THE CHARACTER TRAIT  
OF THE CHIEFEVAL.  IT IS VITAL TO OUR SUCCESS THAT CHIEF PETTY  
OFFICERS SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATE DIVERSITY INTO THE FABRIC OF  
THEIR CHARACTER AND INTO THE COMMAND'S EVERY DAY ACTIVITIES. 
 A GRADE OF 2.0 IN CHARACTER MUST BE SPECIFICALLY SUBSTANTIATED 
IN BLOCK 41.  IF A 2.0 GRADE IN CHARACTER IS ASSIGNED, THE REPORT IS  
CONSIDERED ADVERSE AND THE CHIEF PETTY OFFICER (E7-E9) IS NOT  
ELIGIBLE FOR ADVANCEMENT, OR ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE A 
RECOMMENDATION OF PROMOTABLE. 
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B.  EVALUATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CNO'S RETENTION AND 
ATTRITION GOALS IS SPREAD ACROSS DECKPLATE LEADERSHIP,  
PROFESSIONALISM, LOYALTY AND CHARACTER. 
 
C.  FITREP PERFORMANCE TRAIT MILITARY BEARING IS EVALUATED IN 
THE 
CHIEFEVAL AS A COMPONENT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM TRAIT.   
THIS WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC PHYSICAL FITNESS ASSESSMENT  
INFORMATION PER REF D GUIDELINES. 
 
D.  THE CRITERIA FOR AN ADVERSE CHIEFEVAL REMAINS THE SAME AS  
THE FITREP EXCEPT AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2.A ABOVE. 
 
3.  EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 2008, REF A AND THE OPERATORS QUICK  
REFERENCE GUIDE, CAN BE DOWNLOADED FROM THE BUPERS WEBSITE  
AT HTTP://WWW.NPC.NAVY.MIL THE CHIEFEVAL WILL BE USED FOR THE  
FIRST TIME TO COINCIDE WITH THE  REGULAR E7 AND E8 REPORTING  
PERIOD ON 15 SEPTEMBER 2008.  FOR THIS EVALUATION PERIOD, THE 15  
DAY MAILING PROCEDURE IS HEREBY EXTENDED 30 DAYS.  SEPTEMBER  
2008 E7-E9 EVALUATIONS MUST BE MAILED TO COMNAVPERSCOM NLT 31  
OCTOBER 2008. 
 
Adapted from, “NAVADMIN 176/08.” by Navy Personnel Command website, 2008.  
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APPENDIX N.  CHIEF PETTY OFFICER CREED 
During the course of this day you have been caused to humbly accept challenge and face 
adversity. This you have accomplished with rare good grace. Pointless as some of these 
challenges may have seemed, there were valid, time-honored reasons behind each pointed barb. It 
was necessary to meet these hurdles with blind faith in the fellowship of Chief Petty Officers. The 
goal was to instill in you that trust is inherent with the donning of the uniform of a Chief. 
 
It was our intent to impress upon you that challenge is good; a great and necessary reality which 
cannot mar you - which, in fact, strengthens you. In your future as a Chief Petty Officer, you will 
be forced to endure adversity far beyond that imposed upon you today. You must face each 
challenge and adversity with the same dignity and good grace you demonstrated today. By 
experience, by performance, and by testing, you have been this day advanced to Chief Petty 
Officer. 
 
In the United States Navy - and only in the United States Navy - the rank of E7 carries with it 
unique responsibilities and privileges you are now bound to observe and expected to fulfill. Your 
entire way of life is now changed. More will be expected of you; more will be demanded of you. 
Not because you are a E7 but because you are now a Chief Petty Officer. You have not merely 
been promoted one paygrade, you have joined an exclusive fellowship and, as in all fellowships, 
you have a special responsibility to your comrades, even as they have a special responsibility to 
you. 
 
This is why we in the United States Navy may maintain with pride our feelings of 
accomplishment once we have attained the position of Chief Petty Officer. Your new 
responsibilities and privileges do not appear in print. They have no official standing; they cannot 
be referred to by name, number, nor file. They have existed for over 100 years, Chiefs before you 
have freely accepted responsibility beyond the call of printed assignment. Their actions and their 
performance demanded the respect of their seniors as well as their juniors. 
 
It is now required that you be the fountain of wisdom, the ambassador of good will, the authority 
in personal relations as well as in technical applications. "Ask the Chief" is a household phrase in 
and out of the Navy. You are now the Chief. The exalted position you have now achieved - and 
the word exalted is used advisedly - exists because of the attitude and performance of the Chiefs 
before you. It shall exist only as long as you and your fellow Chiefs maintain these standards. It 
was our intention that you never forget this day. 
 
It was our intention to test you, to try you, and to accept you. Your performance has assured us 
that you will wear "the hat" with the same pride as your comrades in arms before you. We take a 
deep and sincere pleasure in clasping your hand, and accepting you as a Chief Petty officer in the 
United States Navy. 
 
Adapted from “NavyChief.com, para. 5–10.” by NavyChief.com website 2010. 
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APPENDIX O.  EVALUATION REPORT AND COUNSELING 
RECORD (E-1 THROUGH E-6) - NAVPERS 1616/26 
 
        Adapted from “NAVPERS 1616/26 (Rev. 3–02).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
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        Adapted from “NAVPERS 1616/26 (Rev. 3–02).” by Naval Personnel Command website 2010. 
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